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Paruch: Silencing the Victims

SILENCING THE VICTIMS
IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS:
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND CHILDREN’S
HEARSAY STATEMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER
MICHIGAN V. BRYANT
Deborah Paruch*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Child sexual abuse prosecutions present challenging evidentiary and constitutional issues. Oftentimes, there is no physical evidence of the abuse. Children will frequently recant their allegations,
since the vast majority of these crimes are committed by a parent,
other relative, or by a friend of the family.1 The child is often the
only witness to the crime because these crimes take place in secret.2
Furthermore, the young child witness may be incapable of understanding the nature of the crime, the significance of his or her testimony, or be too frightened or anxious to testify.3 The problem is
compounded when courts find young children incompetent to testify
on the grounds that they are unable to distinguish the truth from lies4
*

Deborah Paruch is an associate professor of law at the University of Detroit Mercy
School of Law. The author would like to thank her research assistant, Grace Trueman, for
all of her help with this article.
1
See Kamala London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research
Tell Us About the Ways That Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 194, 195, 216-17
(2005) (discussing numerous scientific studies showing a wide range of recantation by alleged child sexual abuse victims); Myrna Raeder, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past: Remember the Ladies and the Children
Too: Crawford‘s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV.
311, 374-75 (2005).
2
Raeder, supra note 1.
3
Brian Fox, Crawford at Its Limits: Hearsay and Forfeiture in Child Abuse Cases, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2009).
4
Victoria Talwar et al., Children’s Conceptual Knowledge of Lying and Its Relation to
Their Actual Behaviors: Implications for Court Competence Examinations, 26 LAW & HUM.
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or because they are unable to communicate in a traditional courtroom
setting.5 As a result of these factors, prosecutors rely heavily on the
use of hearsay in child abuse prosecutions, with children‘s statements
primarily presented as excited utterances, statements made in connection with medical diagnosis and treatment, or through the catchall or
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule.6
It is often difficult to separate emotion from reason in these
cases given the nature of the crime. Moreover, because of the highly
charged emotions these crimes bring out, it can be easy to overlook
the devastating effect that false accusations of this nature have on the
accused. Marriages and careers have been destroyed and reputations
ruined as the result of false accusations of sexual abuse.7 But it is
precisely because of the highly emotional nature of these offenses
that courts must proceed with caution to assure that the proper balance is maintained between the competing interests at stake: the need
BEHAV. 395, 396 (2002).
5
Raeder, supra note 1, at 376.
6
Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The
Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1009 (2007).
7
Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The Need
for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
207, 208-09 & n.7 (1995) (citing RICHARD A. GARDNER, TRUE AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF
CHILD SEX ABUSE xxvii (1992)). Prosecutors continue to pursue cases even though they
have insufficient evidence. Id. at 210-11 & nn.15-17 (providing instances of prosecutorial
excess). A recent case in Michigan illustrates what can happen in an overzealous quest to
prosecute allegations of sexual abuse. Julian and Thal Wendrow were charged in late 2007
with sexual abuse after their 14-year-old autistic and mute daughter alleged through facilitated communication (FC) that her father had sexually abused her. Brian Dickerson, Op-Ed.,
How Judicial Cowardice Prolonged a Travesty, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 19, 2011, at A23.
The facilitated communication in this case involved a school aide who guided the girl‘s hand
on a keyboard. Id. The aide reported the allegations to school authorities, which in turn contacted the police. L.L. Brasier & John Wisely, A Family’s Nightmare, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
June 12, 2011, at A1. The parents were arrested and their daughter and son were placed in
foster care. Id. Thal Wendrow was ultimately released on house arrest, however, Julian was
imprisoned for nearly three months. Dickerson, supra. Although there was no evidence to
indicate that FC was anything but junk science, the police and prosecutors continued their
case against the parents. Id. Their attempts to communicate with the young girl without FC
were unsuccessful. Id. The prosecutors and police also aggressively questioned the Wendrows‘ son and dismissed a nurse‘s evaluation that tended to exonerate the Wendrows.
Brasier & Wisely, supra. They also attempted to communicate with the girl using FC even
after a court barred them from doing so. Id. Four months after the case began, the prosecution was forced to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. Id. All in all, the Wendrow family
was separated for 106 days. Id. Julian and Thal lost their jobs and believe they will always
be viewed with suspicion. Id. They ultimately filed a federal lawsuit against police, the
prosecutors, and the school district. L.L. Brasier, Parents Target Prosecutors, School, Police, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 17, 2011, at A7. They recently settled their claims against
the police department for $1.8 million. Id.
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to protect the vulnerable victims of these dreadful crimes and safeguarding a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.8
Under the standard enunciated in Ohio v. Roberts,9 courts
were free to admit hearsay statements without fear of violating the
Confrontation Clause so long as the court found that the statements
bore an ―adequate indicia of reliability.‖10 Additionally, the statements were presumed to be reliable if they fit within a firmly established exception to the hearsay rule.11 The Supreme Court‘s 2004
decision in Crawford v. Washington12 overruled Roberts and shifted
the focus from the reliability of the hearsay statements to an examination of the nature of the statements themselves, requiring courts to determine if the statement fit within the Court‘s loosely defined definition of a ―testimonial‖ statement.13 The Court held that a statement
would be testimonial if it was made ― ‗under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.‘ ‖14 The Court further
held that if a hearsay statement is found to be testimonial, it cannot be
admitted in a criminal trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.15
In the seven years since the Crawford decision, the Court has
issued two other decisions on this matter. Davis v. Washington16 was
decided in 2006. In Davis, the Court further developed its definition
of testimonial statements, holding that statements made to police during an ―ongoing emergency‖ were not testimonial because the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable the police to respond to
the situation at hand, rather than produce evidence for use at a subsequent trial.17
In February 2011, the Court handed down its decision in

8
See Marks, supra note 7, at 214-18 (discussing conflicting issues of need for hearsay in
sexual abuse cases and the possible infringements to a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation).
9
448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
10
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
11
Id.
12
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
13
Id. at 68-69.
14
Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for Nat‘l Ass‘n Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. -as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410) at *3).
15
Id. at 68-69.
16
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
17
Id. at 822.
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Michigan v. Bryant.18 In Bryant, the Court further developed the
―ongoing emergency‖ rule it established in Davis, and in doing so,
suggested that the duration of an emergency in domestic violence
cases will typically be much shorter than in other types of crimes.19
Although the Court affirmed the requirement that courts should apply
an objective standard in determining ― ‗the primary purpose of the interrogation,‘ ‖ the Court shifted the focus of the inquiry from the declarant to the interrogator, particularly in situations where a declarant
is operating under a disability.20 Finally, the Court reintroduced the
concept of reliability into its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, although it provided no guidance as to how this concept should be applied, nor did it explain how the reliability of a hearsay statement
could be relevant to the determination of whether a statement is testimonial.21
This article examines the changes to Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence brought about by the Bryant decision, particularly as it
relates to children‘s hearsay statements in criminal sexual abuse trials, and argues that the effect of this decision will be to further restrict the admission of these statements in cases where the children do
not testify. Part II of this article briefly sets forth the history of the
Confrontation Clause and includes a discussion of the admissibility
of children‘s hearsay statements during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Part III reviews the Supreme Court‘s decisions in

18

131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
Id. at 1156.
20
Id. at 1156, 1161-62 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
21
Id. at 1174-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Another line of cases decided by the Supreme
Court dealing with Confrontation Clause challenges to the admissibility of hearsay involve
reports containing forensic analysis of certain seized substances. In the first case, MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, the Court held that an analyst‘s sworn affidavit, setting forth the results of a forensic analysis and reporting that the substance tested was found to be cocaine,
was a testimonial statement and inadmissible in the absence of a showing that the analyst
was unavailable to testify at trial and that the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Court held that the admission of a laboratory report containing a forensic analysis of the defendant‘s blood sample through the in court testimony of a scientist
employed by the laboratory, but who neither observed nor performed the test, violated the
Confrontation Clause. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). At the time of
this writing, the Court is deciding Williams v. Illinois, which raises the question of whether
the Confrontation Clause is violated where a prosecution expert in a criminal case relies on a
testimonial lab report in forming his opinion, the report is disclosed to the jury under Fed. R.
Evid. 703, and the author of the report fails to appear as a witness at the trial. People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 274 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
19
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Ohio v. Roberts,22 Crawford v. Washington,23 Davis v. Washington,24
and Michigan v. Bryant.25 Part IV examines state and federal cases
that involved children‘s hearsay statements in sexual abuse prosecutions. It illustrates how courts resolved questions related to children‘s hearsay under Roberts and how Crawford and Davis altered the
resolution of these issues. Part V analyzes the Bryant decision and
demonstrates how this decision will likely serve to further restrict the
admissibility of children‘s hearsay statements in sexual abuse prosecutions. The article concludes with recommendations that courts can
employ to increase the likelihood that children will testify at trial. It
also recommends that prosecutors utilize pre-trial depositions when
feasible to do so, as these can preserve a defendant‘s Confrontation
Clause rights by providing the defendant with an opportunity for
cross-examination of the child witness before the actual trial, therefore assuring that the child‘s testimonial statements will be admitted
at trial.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides: ―In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . .‖26 The right of confrontation serves two purposes,
which have been described as follows:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation
is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross22

448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
24
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
25
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
26
U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Amendment was proposed to Congress in 1789 and
adopted in 1791. H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85-88 (1789), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(hj001139)) (introducing the Bill of Rights Amendments); see Ratification of Constitutional Amendments,
U.S. CONST. ONLINE, http://www.usconstitution.net/constamrat.html (last modified Nov. 11,
2010) (stating the dates that states ratified the Bill of Rights; Virginia was the eleventh state
to ratify on December 15, 1791 providing the required majority of eleven out of fourteen
states). The Confrontation Clause is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965) (holding that the right of confrontation is a fundamental right made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
23

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 [2012], Art. 6

90

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 28

examination. The opponent demands confrontation,
not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or
of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of
cross-examination, which cannot be had except by direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining
immediate answers.
....
There is, however, a secondary advantage to be
obtained by the personal appearance of the witness;
the judge and the jury are enabled to obtain the elusive
and incommunicable evidence of a witness’ deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral
effect is produced upon the witness.27
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
right to not be confronted with hearsay is a corollary to the right of
cross-examination.28 Hearsay presents two distinct legal issues:
whether the out-of-court statements are admissible under the established evidentiary rules and whether the admissibility of the hearsay
statements in a criminal proceeding violates the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment. In California v. Green,29 the Court noted:
[W]e have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue
were admitted under an arguable recognized hearsay
exception. The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a longestablished hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic
conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.30
The Confrontation Clause has its origins in Roman law and
the common law of England.31 Many discussions of the history of the
27

3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 1395, at 94, 96 (2d ed. 1923).
28

See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (explaining that while there is
overlap between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay prohibitions, there is no complete
congruence).
29
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
30
Id. at 155-56 (internal citations omitted).
31
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
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Confrontation Clause begin by noting that history provides scant
guidance in interpreting it.32 Justice Harlan, concurring in Green,
noted: ―As the Court‘s opinion suggests, the Confrontation Clause
comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give us very little
insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.‖33
In the common law of England, the development of the hearsay rule, as a ―distinct and living idea,‖ did not begin until the
sixteenth century and did not reach full development until the early
eighteenth century.34 The process of obtaining information from persons who were not called as witnesses during the trial was a common
practice in trials in England during the fifteenth century.35 In fact, it
was a standard practice for jurors to confer privately with witnesses
outside of court, where the witnesses would ―inform‖ the juror.36
This practice was described by Chief Justice Fortescue in 1450, ― ‗If
the jurors come to a man where he lives, in the country, to have
knowledge of the truth of the matter, and he informs them, it is justifiable.‘ ‖37 In those days, jurors also may have been provided with a
―counsel‘s report,‖ which documented what a witness might have
said or predicted what the witness would likely say about the matter
before the court.38 During this time, there was little to no objection to
the use of these types of out-of-court statements at trial.39
During the seventeenth century, juries came to depend, with
increased frequency, on in-court testimony as the chief source of their
information.40 At this time, a sense of impropriety arose surrounding
the use of out-of-court statements, based principally on the notion
that when these types of statements are used as evidence, they should
32
See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the history of the development of the Confrontation Clause). ―From the scant information available it may tentatively be concluded that the Confrontation Clause was meant to
constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses.‖ Green, 399 U.S. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33
Green, 399 U.S. at 173-74.
34
John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904).
35
Id. at 438-39.
36
Id. at 440.
37
Id. (quoting Chief Justice Fortescue).
38
Id. at 441.
39
Wigmore, supra note 34, at 440. Actually, the process of producing fact witnesses at
trial was discouraged. Id. at 440-41. Compulsory process for witnesses was not provided
until 1562-1563. Id. at 440.
40
Id. at 441.
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be admitted only if the person affected by them had an opportunity to
test their trustworthiness by means of cross-examination.41 It was also during this period of time that considerable thought was being given to the quantity and the reliability of the evidence that would allow
jurors to reach a correct decision. Statutes and other rules were
passed that addressed topics such as ―good and sufficient‖ or ―good
and lawful‖ proofs.42 It was as a result of these transformations that
courts began to question ―whether a hearsay [sic] thus laid before [a
jury] would suffice‖43 and courts began to challenge the validity of
verdicts where the evidence presented at trial consisted solely of
hearsay.44
Many accounts of the history of the Confrontation Clause cite
the infamous prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603.45
Raleigh was charged with conspiring against King James by raising
money abroad to distribute to rebels with the objective of having
Arabella Stuart placed on the throne.46 The most damaging evidence
presented by the prosecution was statements that Lord Cobham had
given during an interrogation conducted in the Tower of London.47
Cobham had allegedly stated that Raleigh was the instigator of the
plan to overthrow the King. During the trial, records of this interrogation along with a letter written by Cobham were read to the jury.48
Raleigh denied the charges, presented evidence that Cobham had recanted his statements, and demanded that the court call Cobham to
appear at trial.49 Raleigh argued, ― ‗[T]he Proof of the Common Law
is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my
accuser before my face.‘ ‖50 However, his request was denied.51 It is
41

Id. at 448.
Wigmore, supra note 34, at 441-42.
43
Id. at 442.
44
Id. at 442-43. For example, a discussion was raised whether the requirement for a conviction for treason, which required evidence from two accusers, could be satisfied if one was
by hearsay. Id. ―[I]t was there holden for law, that of two accusers, if one be an accuser of
his own knowledge, or of his own hearing, and he relate it to another, the other may well be
an accuser.‖ Thomas‘s Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 218, 218-19 (1553).
45
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
46
Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB.
L. 381, 388 (1951).
47
Id.; Jacqueline Forsgren Cronkhite, Signed, Sealed, Delivered . . . Unconstitutional: The
Effect of Melendez-Diaz on the Use of Notarized Crime Laboratory Reports in Arkansas, 63
ARK. L. REV. 757, 761 (2010).
48
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
49
Id.
50
Id. (quoting Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, (1603) 1 James I. 15-16, available in 2 T.B.
42
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reported that one of the judges responding to Raleigh‘s request stated:
― ‗[M]any horse-stealers may escape, if they may not be condemned
without witnesses.‘ ‖52 Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to
death.53
It was during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries
that courts began to question the practice of freely admitting hearsay.54 However, at this time, the law distinguished hearsay statements made under oath from those that were not.55 It was common
practice to have a sworn statement read aloud to the jury and for the
deponent to confirm it by indicating that it was freely and voluntarily
made.56 By the end of the seventeenth century, this practice of admitting sworn extrajudicial statements was abandoned in favor of one
that required the testimony of the witness in court.57
In fact, two trials decided in 1696, The King v. Paine58 and
Fenwick’s Trial,59 appear to have solidified the rule that hearsay
statements, including those given under oath, should not be admitted
if there was no prior opportunity for cross-examination. In Paine, the
declarant had given a deposition under oath in front of the Mayor of
Bristol but died before the trial.60 The King‘s Bench remarked,
―[T]hese depositions should not be given in evidence, the defendant
not being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so had
lost the benefit of a cross-examination.‖61
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the hearsay rule
had become settled doctrine and prohibited out-of-court statements
from being used as evidence at trial unless the opponent was proHOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON
AND
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 15-16
(1816),
available
at
http://books.google.com/books?id=9AxAAAAAYAAJ&dq=Let%20Cobhan%20be%20here
%20let%20him%20speak%20it&pg=PT19#v=onepage&q&f=false (last visited Oct. 11,
2011)).
51
Id.
52
Miller v. Indiana, 517 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ind. 1987) (quoting K. Graham, The Right of
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L.
BULL. 99, 100 (1972)).
53
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
54
Wigmore, supra note 34, at 441-43.
55
Id. at 445-46, 448, 451.
56
Id. at 448, 451.
57
Id. at 451-56.
58
The King v. Paine, (1700) 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B.).
59
Fenwick‘s Trial, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591-93 (Eng.).
60
Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. at 584.
61
Id. at 585.
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vided with an opportunity for cross-examination.62 This prohibition
applied to both sworn and unsworn statements.63
Children‘s hearsay statements were treated differently from
those of adults during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
The law generally allowed children‘s hearsay statements in criminal
trials in the absence of their sworn testimony on the grounds of necessity; the statements were the best evidence available in the absence of live testimony.64 Furthermore, courts routinely admitted
children‘s statements that were made before magistrates whose function was to determine if an arrest warrant should be issued or whether
the defendant should be detained and held over for trial.65
It was also during this period of time that judges were beginning to understand the necessity of abolishing the presumption of a
child witness‘ incompetence. The decision in The King v. Brasier66 is
an example of a case involving hearsay statements of a young child in
62

5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at 27 (Little,
Brown and Company rev. ed. 1974).
63
Id. (quoting Lent v. Shear, 55 N.E. 2, 4 (N.Y. 1899)). One author has summed it up as
follows: ―Such . . . seems to have been the course of development of that most characteristic
rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence – a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury
trial, the greatest contribution of that eminently practical legal system to the world‘s methods
of procedure.‖ Id. at 28.
64
Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children’s Hearsay: From Old
Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029, 1036 (2007).
65
Id. at 1045.
66
168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779). Several different versions of the opinion in this case have
been published. Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 923-31 (2007). The various reported opinions differ with respect to whether the child‘s mother testified at the trial
and whether she should have been allowed to testify as to her child‘s statements. Id. at 926,
928. One published version indicates that the mother did testify at the trial. Id. at 926. It
reported that the ―Judges determined, therefore, that the evidence of the information which
the infant had given to her mother . . . ought not to have been received.‖ Id. at 926 (citing
Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202). Another version of the case published in 1789 makes no reference to the child‘s mother or her testimony. Id. at 928. This version indicates that the child
appeared before the court, was unable to take the oath, but nonetheless was allowed to testify
at the trial. Mosteller, supra at 928. On appeal, the judges ruled that because she was unable
to take the oath, she should not have been allowed to testify. Id.
Brasier appears to have had no effect on the admissibility of children‘s hearsay statements. Lyon and LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1052. Prior to Braiser, if a child was unavailable to testify, the child‘s hearsay statements were admitted on the grounds that it was the
best evidence available. Id. at 1034-35. After Brasier, children were not presumed incompetent to testify. See id. at 1053. Rather, courts evaluated a child‘s testimonial competence
and if the child was found competent to testify, he or she would be allowed to do so. See id.
If she was found incompetent, she would not be allowed to testify, but her hearsay statements would be admissible. See id.
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a sexual abuse trial.67 In Brasier, a young rape victim, ―immediately
on her coming home, told all the circumstances of the injury‖ to her
mother.68 Brasier stands for the proposition that courts should assess
a child for testimonial competence; thereby, children‘s hearsay
statements were admissible only if they were found to be incompetent
to testify.69
Although children‘s hearsay statements regarding sexual
abuse appear to have been freely admitted in criminal trials during
this period of time, the weight given to these statements was often
limited either by juror choice or pursuant to instructions from the
judge.70 Rape convictions were rare.71 This was likely due to the difficulty of obtaining physical proof of the crime (rape required proof
67

Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 203.
Id. Brasier is cited in Davis as support for the Court‘s conclusion that the 911 call was
reporting an ongoing emergency and therefore not testimonial under the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. In Davis, the Court noted that had the statements
been the young girl‘s screams for help as her assailant was chasing her, the statements would
have been made during an ongoing emergency. Id. However, by the time she reached home,
her statements were nothing more than ―an account of past events.‖ Id. The Davis Court‘s
reference to this as instructive of the Framers‘ intent with respect to the Confrontation
Clause has been criticized on the grounds that the authors of the Sixth Amendment would
probably not have been aware of the Brasier decision. Mosteller, supra note 66, at 924-25.
The Sixth Amendment was proposed to Congress in 1789 and ratified in 1791. Id. at 924.
The Brasier decision was handed down in 1779. Id. However, it was not published until
1791, and, the English Reporter cited by the Davis Court for the Brasier decision was not
published until 1925. Id. at 923-24. In Bryant, Justice Scalia mockingly suggested that the
majority would use this case as support for their holding that the declarant‘s statements were
nontestimonial. Justice Scalia stated:
But today‘s majority presumably would hold the daughter‘s account to
her mother a nontestimonial statement made during an ongoing emergency. She could not have known whether her attacker might reappear
to attack again or attempt to silence the lone witness against him. Her
mother likely listened to the account to assess the threat to her own safety and to decide whether the rapist posed a threat to the community that
required the immediate intervention of the local authorities.
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69
Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1054-55 (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §1760, at 241 (1904)). It
has been suggested that Brasier does reflect the contemporary thinking of the judges at that
time regarding a child‘s competency as a witness and the significance of the oath. Id. at
1053. Interestingly, the judges did not appear to be concerned with the issue of whether her
statements were testimonial. See Mosteller, supra note 66, at 925-26.
70
Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1046. Lyon and LaMagna reviewed all of the cases involving child sexual abuse that were tried between the years 1684 and 1789 from the
Old Bailey Session Papers. Id. at 1039, 1041. ―The Old Bailey was the trial court for felonies committed in London and . . . in the adjoining county of Middlesex.‖ Id. at 1039.
71
Id. at 1047.
68
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of penetration), the fact that delays in reporting were considered evidence that the rape did not occur, and because rape was a capital
offense (jurors may have been reluctant to convict the defendant
based solely on the statements of a child).72 It is against this historical backdrop that the Confrontation Clause became part of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.73
III.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S MODERN
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CASES

Since 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of
seminal decisions involving hearsay evidence and the modern day defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
A.

Ohio v. Roberts

In Ohio v. Roberts,74 the issue before the Court was whether a
declarant‘s preliminary hearing testimony could be admitted in a subsequent criminal trial on the same matter when she was unavailable at
trial and where she was not cross-examined at the preliminary hearing.75 The respondent, Roberts, was arrested and charged with forging checks belonging to Bernard Isaacs and possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Bernard and Amy Isaacs, the parents of the
declarant, Anita Isaacs.76 At the preliminary hearing Robert‘s attorney called Anita Isaacs to the stand where she testified that she knew
72
Id. at 1047-48. Even though hearsay appears to have been freely admitted, the researchers reported an eighty-six percent acquittal rate, or nineteen out of twenty-two trials.
Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1047. The researchers have theorized that judges may
have instructed jurors to ignore the hearsay evidence. Id. at 1046. The researchers also
found numerous references to the insufficiency of the evidence to prove rape, particularly in
the absence of the child victim‘s testimony. Id. at 1050-52. They found that in nine of the
nineteen acquittals, although the defendants were acquitted of the rape charges, they were
bound over to await a new trial on a lesser charge such as assault or attempted rape. Id. at
1051. They noted that child hearsay could be used to support a charge of assault or attempted rape, even while being insufficient to support a capital rape conviction. Id. at 105152. The hearsay evidence was found to be ―insufficient rather than inadmissible.‖ Lyon &
LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1052.
73
U.S. CONST. amend VI states in part: ―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .‖
74
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
75
Id. at 58.
76
Id. at 58-59.
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Roberts and that she had allowed him to stay at her apartment for a
few days while she was away.77 During defense counsel‘s direct examination, counsel tried to get Anita Isaacs to admit that she had given Roberts the checks and credit cards, but she denied doing so.78
Defense counsel did not request to treat her as a hostile witness.79
She was not questioned by the prosecutor.80
Anita Isaacs left town following the preliminary hearing; although the prosecution issued several subpoenas, they were unable to
procure her attendance at trial.81 Roberts took the stand during his
trial and testified that Anita had given him the credit cards and the
checks with the understanding that he was free to use them.82 On rebuttal, the prosecution offered into evidence the transcript of Anita
Isaacs‘ preliminary hearing testimony.83 The court allowed the transcript into evidence, and the jury convicted Roberts on all counts.84
The Supreme Court began its discussion by noting that while
the Confrontation Clause prefers ―face-to-face confrontation at trial,‖
the primary interest is the right of cross-examination.85 The Court also noted that this right is not absolute, stating, ― ‗[G]eneral rules of
law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable
to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.‘ ‖86 The Court further explained that ―[t]he Confrontation Clause operates in two [distinct]
ways to restrict the [scope] of admissible hearsay.‖87 First, a rule of
necessity is implicit in the Sixth Amendment, which requires that the

77

Id. at 58.
Id.
79
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 59-60.
82
Id. at 59.
83
Id. The prosecution relied on an Ohio statute that permitted the use of preliminary examination testimony of a witness who ― ‗cannot for any reason be produced at the trial
. . . .‘ ‖ Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (West 1975)).
The trial court conducted a voir dire hearing, and the court admitted the transcript into evidence after testimony from Amy Isaacs in which she stated that she had no way to reach her
daughter. Id. at 59-60.
84
Id. at 60.
85
Id. at 63 (― ‗[A] primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of crossexamination.‘ ‖ (alteration in the original) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418
(1965))).
86
Id. at 64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
87
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (italics omitted).
78
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hearsay declarant be unavailable at trial.88 Second, the Confrontation
Clause only allows the admission of that hearsay evidence which is
found to be trustworthy; the statement must bear adequate ―indicia of
reliability.‖89 The Court stated that ―[r]eliability [could] be inferred‖
where the hearsay ―falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,‖
and that if it does not, then it may be admitted upon ―a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.‖90 The Court concluded
that Anita Isaacs‘ preliminary examination testimony bore adequate
indicia of reliability because Roberts‘ attorney challenged her testimony at the preliminary hearing ―with the equivalent of significant
cross-examination.‖91

88

Id.
Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 70. Two decisions involving children‘s hearsay statements and the Confrontation
Clause were decided in the decade following the Roberts decision. See Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). Wright involved the admissibility
of hearsay statements made by a young child to a physician identifying her abuser. Wright,
497 U.S. at 808. The trial court admitted the statements under its residual hearsay exception.
Id. at 811. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 813 (citing State v. Wright, 775 P.2d
1224, 1231 (Idaho 1989)). The United States Supreme Court noted that in order for hearsay
statements to be admissible in a criminal trial, the statements ―must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of [their] inherent trustworthiness . . . .‖ Id. at 822. The Court examined ―the
totality of the circumstances surrounding‖ the young child‘s statements to the physician, including her age, her motive to fabricate, and the suggestive manner of the physician‘s questioning, and concluded that the State had failed to show that her incriminating statements
were particularly trustworthy. Id. at 826. It also held that evidence corroborating the truth
of a hearsay statement may not be used to support a finding that the statement possesses indicia of reliability sufficient to meet the demands of the Confrontation Clause. Wright, 497
U.S. at 823. The Court noted that physical evidence of sexual abuse sheds no light on the
reliability of a child‘s statement identifying her abuser. Id. at 826. The Court did note however, that ―the presence of corroborating evidence‖ might be used to demonstrate that the
admission of the hearsay statement would be harmless error. Id. at 823.
In White, the second case decided in the decade following the Roberts decision, the
Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of unavailability before
a young child‘s hearsay statements could be admitted under ―a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule.‖ White, 502 U.S. at 356. Here, a four-year-old child made statements to her
mother, her babysitter, a police officer, an emergency room nurse, and a physician. Id. at
349-50. The trial court admitted these statements as either excited utterances or statements
made in seeking medical treatment (two of the exceptions to the hearsay rule). Id. at 350-51.
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court‘s ruling finding that ―a statement that qualifies for
admission under a ‗firmly rooted‘ hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing
can be expected to add little to its reliability.‖ Id. at 357. This decision has subsequently
been criticized by the Crawford Court, the Davis Court, and Justice Scalia‘s dissenting opinion in Bryant. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Davis, 547 U.S. at
825; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
89
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Crawford v. Washington

In Crawford v. Washington,92 the Court overruled its decision
in Roberts.93 Justice Scalia, writing for a seven Justice majority, held
that the prosecution‘s use of a tape-recorded statement, obtained by
police during an interrogation of the defendant‘s wife, in the defendant‘s subsequent trial for assault and attempted murder violated the
Confrontation Clause because the defendant‘s wife was not available
to testify at trial.94
The facts of the case are as follows. Michael Crawford and
his wife, Sylvia, had gone in search of Kenneth Lee after Sylvia
informed Michael that Lee had attempted to assault her.95 They
found Lee at his apartment where a fight ensued.96 During the fight,
Lee was stabbed in the chest and Michael‘s hand was cut.97 The police arrested Michael and Sylvia who were subsequently interrogated
separately after being given appropriate Miranda warnings.98 Although Michael and Sylvia‘s accounts of the events leading up to the
assault were substantially similar, their accounts differed as to whether Lee had drawn a weapon before Michael assaulted him.99 Michael
was subsequently charged with stabbing Lee.100 The police did not
press charges against Sylvia.101
At trial, Michael claimed self-defense.102 Due to the state‘s
marital privilege, Sylvia was unavailable to testify. 103 The prosecution sought to introduce the statements that Sylvia had made to the
police following the assault in order to show that Michael did not stab
Lee in self-defense.104 The trial court, following the decision in Ro92

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 68-69.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 38.
96
Id.
97
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 38-40.
100
Id. at 40.
101
Id.
102
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
103
Id.
104
Id. Although Sylvia‘s statements generally corroborated those given by Michael, they
differed on one significant point – whether Lee had a weapon. Michael stated:
I could a swore I seen him goin‘ [sic] for somethin‘ [sic] before,
right before everything happened. He was like reachin‘ [sic], fiddlin‘
93
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berts, admitted the statements into evidence on the grounds that the
statements bore ―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.‖105 As
a result, Michael was convicted of assault.106 On appeal the Washington Court of Appeals reversed; however, the Washington Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court and reinstated the conviction.107
Justice Scalia authored the Supreme Court‘s opinion, starting
with a lengthy discussion of the history of the Sixth Amendment‘s
Confrontation Clause, in which he traced its roots to the common law
of England.108 He also discussed the controversial ex parte examination procedures that were employed in the Colonies during the eighteenth century.109 He suggested that this history permits two inferences about the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.110 First, the
Confrontation Clause was specifically directed at the ―use of ex parte
examinations as evidence‖ in criminal proceedings against the accused; and second, ―the Framers would not have allowed [the] admission of testimonial statements‖ of an unavailable witness unless the
defendant was previously afforded an opportunity for crossexamination.111
Justice Scalia explained that the Confrontation Clause applies
to witnesses – ―those who ‗bear testimony,‘ ‖ and that testimony is
― ‗a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.‘ ‖112 He further explained, in a now oftquoted phrase: ―An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes
[sic] around down here and stuff . . . and I just . . . I don‘t know, I think,
this is just a possibility, but I think, I think that he pulled somethin‘ [sic]
out and I grabbed for it and that‘s how I got cut . . . but I‘m not positive.
Id. at 38-39. Conversely, Sylvia stated:
Okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike Michael‘s
hand down or something and then he put his hands in his . . . put his right
hand in his right pocket . . . took a step back . . . Michael proceeded to
stab him . . . then his hands were like . . . how do you explain this . . .
open arms . . . with his hands open and he fell down . . . and we ran.
Id. at 39. She also stated that she did not see anything in Lee‘s hands during the fight.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
105
Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
Id. at 41.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 43-47.
109
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47.
110
Id. at 50.
111
Id. at 50, 53-54.
112
Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.‖113 He provided several
examples of testimonial statements including ex parte in-court testimony, affidavits, prior testimony that did not provide an opportunity
for cross-examination, grand jury proceedings, and custodial examinations, and concluded that testimonial statements are ―statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.‖114
Justice Scalia criticized the Court‘s previous decision in Roberts on the grounds that conditioning the admissibility of hearsay
evidence on whether it ―bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness‖ or ―falls [within] a firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ is in
conflict with the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, principally because it allows a jury to hear evidence, which can include
statements that are in fact ex parte testimony, upon a simple judicial
determination of reliability.115 In responding to the dissent‘s argument that the fact that a statement might be testimonial does not undermine the ―wisdom‖ of the hearsay exceptions, he stated:
Involvement of government officers in the production
of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique
potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out
113

Id.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal quotation marks omitted). He also explained
that statements taken by police officers at interrogations are testimonial, in that they ―bear a
striking resemblance to the examinations conducted by justices of the peace in England.‖ Id.
at 52. The fact that the ―interrogators are police officers rather than magistrates does not
change‖ the outcome. Id. at 53. Noting the function – he commented that English justices of
the peace did not function as the magistrates of today; rather, they had essentially an investigative and prosecutorial role. Id. He also noted that there could be various definitions of
―interrogation‖ just as there are of ―testimonial.‖ Id. at n.4. He refused to articulate a comprehensive definition of ―testimonial,‖ noting: ―Whatever else the term covers, it applies at
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.‖ Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
115
Id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). He criticized one court for finding that a
witness‘s statements that were made to the police while in custody were reliable because
they were clearly against the declarant‘s penal interest. Id. at 63 (citing Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003)). He also criticized other courts
that found that statements were reliable because they were made under oath in a judicial proceeding such as a plea allocution or before a grand jury. Id. at 65 (citing United States v.
Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (plea allocution); United States v. Papajohn, 212
F.3d 1112, 1120 (8th Cir. 2000) (grand jury testimony)). He noted: ―Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.‖
Id. at 62.
114
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time and again throughout a history with which the
Framers were keenly familiar. This consideration
does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall
within some broad, modern hearsay exception, even if
that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances.116
In closing, he noted that where testimonial evidence is at issue, ―the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.‖117
C. Davis v. Washington
One year after its decision in Crawford, the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington.118 In Davis, the Court consolidated
two cases for review.119 The consolidated cases were Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.120 In Davis, Michelle McCottry
made a 911 emergency call during a domestic dispute with her boyfriend, Adrian Davis.121 During the call, she identified Davis and informed the operator that he was beating her with his fists.122 While
she was speaking to the operator, Davis left the house and drove
away in his car.123 The police arrived approximately four minutes
later, finding McCottry in a ―shaken state [with] . . . injuries on her
forearm and face.‖124 Davis was charged with a felony violation of a
no-contact order.125 McCottry did not appear at trial and the court,
over Davis‘ objections, admitted the recording of McCottry‘s 911
call.126
In Hammon, police officers responded to a domestic distur116

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. Furthermore, the historical sources demonstrate that
there is little evidence of exceptions employed to allow the admission of testimonial statements against an accused in a criminal trial. Id. He notes that the one deviation from this
appears to be the exception for dying declarations – the existence of which he says cannot be
disputed. Id. at n.6.
117
Id. at 68.
118
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
119
Id. at 817, 819.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 817.
122
Id.
123
Davis, 547 U.S. at 818.
124
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 819.
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bance report at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon.127 When
they arrived, they found Amy on the front porch alone. 128 Although
she appeared frightened, she told them that nothing was wrong.129
When they entered the house, they noticed broken glass in the corner
of the living room.130 They found Hershel in the kitchen, where he
told the officers that he and his wife had been fighting ―but [that]
everything was fine now.‖131 The officers separated Amy and Hershel and after Amy presented her side of the story, they had her fill
out a battery affidavit.132 In the affidavit, she explained that Hershel
had broken their furnace, shoved her onto the floor, hit her in the
chest, broke some lamps, and attacked her daughter.133 Hershel was
charged with domestic battery.134 Amy was subpoenaed but did not
appear at trial.135 In her absence, the trial court allowed the officers
to testify as to the statements she made and also granted the prosecution‘s motion to admit her affidavit.136
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority and citing Crawford,
noted that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the ― ‗admission of testimonial statements of a witness unless the witness is unavailable to
testify at trial and the defendant was afforded a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.‘ ‖137 He noted that under the definition provided
in Crawford, testimonial statements include ― ‗[s]tatements taken by
police officers in the course of interrogations.‘ ‖138 However, he excluded police interrogations that occur in emergency situations from
this rule, stating:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 819-20.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 821 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54).
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).
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circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.139
The Court explained that in determining whether an interrogation produced testimonial statements, courts should apply an objective test and determine the primary purpose of the interrogation.140
Courts will need to consider whether the statements described a past
event and whether a reasonable person in the listener‘s position
would understand that the declarant‘s statements were a call for help
amidst a genuine threat.141 Moreover, courts should examine the nature of the questions asked and the responses received to determine
whether the statements were necessary to allow law enforcement to
respond to the present emergency.142 Finally, courts should consider
the degree of formality surrounding the interview because this is an
important factor in determining whether a declarant‘s statements are
testimonial.143
In applying these rules to Davis and Hammon, the Court
found that in Davis, it was clear that the victim‘s statements made
during the 911 call were a call for help.144 It was also clear from the
nature of the questions asked by the 911 operator that the information
elicited was necessary for the police to be able to respond to the
present emergency.145 The Court contrasted Sylvia Crawford‘s
statements at the police station with McCottry‘s frantic statements
made during the 911 call and found that the level of informality in the
latter situation supported the conclusion that her statements were not

139

Id. But see id. at n.2 (noting that although the holding refers to interrogations, ―statements made in the absence of any interrogation[s] are [not] necessarily nontestimonial[,]‖
which suggests that volunteered statements or responses to open-ended questions might, under the right circumstances, also be deemed testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment).
140
Id. at 826.
141
Id. at 826-27.
142
Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
143
Id.; see also id. at 822 n.1 (noting that statements made in the absence of interrogation
might also be testimonial such as volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions.
Justice Scalia emphasized that the focus is on the declarant stating: ―[I]t is in the final analysis the declarant‘s statements, not the interrogator‘s questions, that the Confrontation Clause
requires us to evaluate.‖).
144
Id. at 827 (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion)).
145
Id.
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testimonial.146
By contrast, the Court found that Amy Hammon‘s statements
to the police were testimonial.147 The Court noted that statements
made during an interrogation, whose purpose is to determine the need
for emergency assistance, may evolve into testimonial statements
once the emergency has passed.148 The Court further noted that in
Hammon, the emergency had ended by the time the officers arrived
on the scene, and Amy Hammon, now protected by the police, was in
no immediate danger.149 Therefore, the Court held that Amy and
Hershel‘s statements to the police were testimonial because they were
given some time after the dramatic events had ended and simply described how the criminal acts began and ended.150
Finally, the Court acknowledged the argument put forth by
the State for greater flexibility in the use of hearsay testimony in cases of domestic abuse because these crimes are ―notoriously susceptible‖ to intimidation of the victims by their assailants to assure that
they do not testify.151 The Court recognized that the ―Confrontation
Clause gives the criminal a windfall‖ when this occurs, but stated:
―We may not . . . vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the
effect of allowing the guilty to go free.‖152 It reminded the State that
the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which provides that a person who attains the absence of a witness through wrongdoing forfeits
the rights afforded by the Confrontation Clause, is the appropriate
doctrine to be applied in these types of cases.153
D.

Michigan v. Bryant

In Michigan v. Bryant,154 the Court examined the parameters
of the ongoing emergency rule it established in Davis and held that
146

Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
Id. at 830.
148
Id. at 828-29 (noting that when this occurs, courts ―[t]hrough in limine procedure[s] . . .
should redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial . . . .‖).
149
Id. at 829-30.
150
Id. at 830; see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (explaining that in Davis the respondent relied on The King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779), but that case did not involve an ongoing emergency because the emergency had passed by the time the young girl came home
to report to her mother that she had been sexually assaulted).
151
Id. at 832-33.
152
Id. at 833.
153
Id.
154
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
147
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the ―circumstances of the interaction between [the decedent] and the
police objectively indicate[d] that the ‗primary purpose of the interrogation‘ was ‗to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.‘ ‖155
In the early morning hours of April 29, 2001, the Detroit Police Department received a call from a gas station attendant reporting
that a man had been shot.156 When the police arrived at the gas station, they found the decedent, Anthony Covington, lying next to his
car in the parking lot.157 The officers noticed that he had been shot in
the abdomen.158 He also appeared to be in great pain and was having
difficulty speaking.159 They asked Covington ― ‗what had happened,
who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.‘ ‖160 He
replied that ―Rick‖ had shot him about a half hour before.161 He also
told the police that he had gone to the defendant‘s house, had a conversation with him through the back door of the house, and that the
defendant shot him when he turned to leave.162 Covington then drove
to the gas station where the police found him.163 Police officers questioned him for approximately five to ten minutes.164 The interrogation ended when emergency medical personnel arrived at the scene.165
Covington was taken to a local hospital where he died a few
hours later.166 When the police later went to the defendant‘s house,
they found Covington‘s wallet along with his identification in the
back yard.167 They also noticed what appeared to be a bullet hole in
the back door of the house and a bullet and blood on the back
porch.168 Approximately one year later, Bryant was arrested in Cali155

Id. at 1150 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
160
Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Mich. 2009), vacated, Bryant,
131 S. Ct. at 1167).
161
Id. (citing Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67 n.1).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
165
Id.
166
Id. (indicating that at this time, the police called for backup and traveled to Bryant‘s
house). But see id. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating that it was approximately three
hours before the police had ―secured the scene‖ of the shooting).
167
Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67.
168
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
156
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fornia and returned to Michigan, where he was subsequently tried for
murder.169
The trial court admitted the statements that Covington made
to the police at the gas station in which he identified Bryant as his
shooter.170 Bryant was convicted of second-degree murder.171 However, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed his conviction.172
Quoting Davis, it found that Covington‘s statements to the police
were inadmissible on the grounds that they were testimonial hearsay.173 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.174
Justice Sotomayor authored the majority opinion.175 She was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and
Alito.176 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.177 The
majority opinion begins with a review of the Court‘s previous decisions in Roberts, Crawford, and Davis.178 The majority reminds us of
its ruling in Crawford, that the reach of the Confrontation Clause is
limited to testimonial statements and that with respect to these statements ―the Sixth Amendment ‗demands what the common law
required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination.‘ ‖179 The Court also explained that not all statements
elicited as the result of police questioning are testimonial, quoting
Davis, the Court stated:
―Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
169

Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67.
Id. at 68.
171
Id. at 67-68.
172
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1151 (citing Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67).
173
Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
174
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1152.
175
Id. at 1149.
176
Id.
177
Id. (Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion; Justice Kagan did not take part in the
decision).
178
Id. at 1152.
179
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1152-53 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).
170
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potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖180
The Court explained that Davis did not attempt to provide a
complete categorization of all possible statements that should be considered testimonial.181 The Court commented that the most important
situations in which the Confrontation Clause restricts the admission
of out-of-court statements are those where ―state actors are involved
in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence
for trial.‖182
Next, the Court described the steps that courts should follow
in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation.183 Courts
should perform an objective evaluation of the circumstances in which
the encounter occurred and an objective assessment of the actions and
statements of all of the parties involved.184 The Court explained the
rationale for this approach:
An objective analysis of the circumstances of an
encounter and the statements and actions of the parties
to it provides the most accurate assessment of the
‗primary purpose of the interrogation.‘ The circumstances in which an encounter occurs . . . are clearly
matters of objective fact. The statements and actions
of the parties must also be objectively evaluated. That
is, the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual
purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals‘ statements and actions and the circumstances
in which the encounter occurred.185
Additionally, the Court noted that in assessing the
circumstances under which statements are made, the existence of an
ongoing emergency is one of the most important circumstances in
determining the primary purpose of an interrogation, because an ongoing emergency focuses the individuals involved on something oth180

Id. at 1154 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
Id. at 1155.
182
Id.; see also id. at n.3 (noting that as in Davis, it is explicitly reserving the question of
whether statements made to persons other than law enforcement personnel can be testimonial).
183
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.
184
Id.
185
Id.
181
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er than ― ‗prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.‘ ‖186
The Court, without explanation, further stated that in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation, ―standard rules of
hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.‖187 The Court also stated:
Implicit in Davis is the idea that because the prospect
of fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably significantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not
require such statements to be subject to the crucible of
cross-examination. This logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance exception in hearsay law.188
This focus on reliability has been absent from the Court‘s
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence since the Roberts decision.189
The Court went on to explain that determining whether an
emergency exists is a fact-dependent inquiry.190 It noted that the existence and duration of an emergency depends on ―the type and scope
of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public.‖191 The
Court suggested that in cases such as Davis and Hammon, the emergency will have a shorter duration than the one in the present case
because domestic violence cases have a ―narrower zone of potential
victims than cases involving threats to public safety.‖192 Furthermore, determining whether an emergency is ongoing will require a
court to ascertain not only the type of weapon involved, but also a
victim‘s medical condition at the time of the encounter.193 A victim‘s
medical condition will be relevant because it ―sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to police
questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a testimonial one.‖194
186

Id. at 1157 (alteration in the original) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
Id. at 1155.
188
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1157.
189
See id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190
Id. at 1158 (majority opinion).
191
Id. at 1162.
192
Id. at 1158.
193
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159.
194
Id.; see also id. (noting, as it did in Davis, that an encounter that begins as an emergency requiring police to determine the need for assistance may not always remain one: the in187
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The Court next addressed the need to examine the statements
and actions of the individuals involved including both the declarant‘s
and the interrogator‘s questions and answers.195 The Court indicated
that this type of examination will eliminate problems that can arise
when either the declarant or the interrogator has mixed motives.196
Although the Court emphasized that determining the primary purpose
of the interrogation is an objective test, it appeared to introduce some
subjectivity into the analysis when it stated: ―The existence of an
emergency or the parties’ perception that an emergency is ongoing is
among the most important circumstances that courts must take into
account in determining whether an interrogation is testimonial
. . . .‖197 The last factor that the Court found to be relevant to the
determination of the primary purpose test is the degree of informality
in the encounter.198
In applying these rules to the case before it, the Court concluded that there was an ongoing emergency at the time the police officers interrogated Covington.199 First, in assessing the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, the Court noted that crimes involving
guns result in a heightened state of emergency.200 This case involved
an armed shooter whose whereabouts were unknown at the time of
the interrogation.201 Second, in examining the statements and actions
of the police officers, the Court found that they responded to a call
that a man had been shot.202 Their questions to Covington focused on
obtaining information about the shooting which was necessary to allow them to ― ‗assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and
possible danger to the potential victim‘ . . . . In other words, they solicited the information necessary to enable them to ‗meet an ongoing
emergency.‘ ‖203
Third, in examining the declarant‘s statements and actions,
the Court found that there was nothing in Covington‘s responses that
would indicate that the emergency had ended because Covington did
terrogation may evolve into a situation in which testimonial statements are made).
195
Id. at 1160.
196
Id. at 1161.
197
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (emphasis added).
198
Id. at 1166.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 1158-59.
201
Id. at 1165-66.
202
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165.
203
Id. at 1166 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 832).
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not know where the shooter was, nor did he give any indication that
his assailant, ―having shot at him twice, would be satisfied that [he]
was only wounded.‖204 The Court also found that ―a person in Covington‘s situation would [not] have had a ‗primary purpose‘ ‗to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,‘ ‖205 because at the time Covington made his statements, he
―was lying in a gas station parking lot bleeding from a mortal gunshot
wound to his abdomen‖ and repeatedly asked when the emergency
medical personnel would arrive.206
Finally, the Court found that the situation in Bryant was similar to the 911 phone call in Davis.207 It noted that ―the officers arrived at different times,‖ the situation was ―fluid and somewhat confused,‖ and that no structured interrogation took place.208 It
concluded that the circumstances of the encounter, coupled with the
statements and actions of Covington and the police officers, demonstrated that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable the
police to respond to an ongoing emergency.209 Hence, Covington‘s
statements were ―not testimonial‖ and not barred by the Confrontation Clause.210
Justice Scalia delivered a scathing dissent, accusing the majority of ―distort[ing] our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and
leav[ing] it in a shambles.‖211 He disagreed with the majority‘s interpretation of facts, stating:
Today‘s tale—a story of five officers conducting successive examinations of a dying man with the primary
purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his testimony
regarding his killer, but of protecting him, them, and
others from a murderer somewhere on the loose – is so
transparently false that professing to believe it demeans this institution.212

204
Id. The Court also suggested that Covington did not have any ―reason to think that the
shooter would not shoot again if he arrived on the scene.‖ Id.
205
Id. at 1165 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
206
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165.
207
Id. at 1166.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 1166-67.
210
Id. at 1167.
211
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212
Id. In arguing that the majority has created an ―expansive exception‖ for violent
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He criticized the majority for creating an ―expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes.‖213 He complained of the shift in focus from the declarant‘s intent to that of the
interrogator,214 particularly in situations where the declarant may be
operating under a disability.215 He also criticized the majority for
crimes, Justice Scalia commented on the timeline for determining an ―ongoing emergency.‖
Id. at 1173. He criticized the majority for failing to answer the question of how long the
emergency situation lasted. Id. In response to the majority‘s comments that the emergency
may have persisted until the police determined the ―[shooter‘s] motive for and location after
the shooting[,]‖ or until the police ―secured the scene of the shooting[,]‖ Justice Scalia
stated: ―This is a dangerous definition of emergency[]‖ because many witnesses who testify
against defendants at subsequent criminal trials give their first statements to police within
hours of a violent act. Id. He also noted that if the prosecution can claim that there was an
ongoing threat to the public, defendants will not have a constitutionally protected right to
exclude this hearsay at their trials. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173. He argued that the Framers
would not have sanctioned this approach. In support of this argument he cited The King v.
Brasier, in which the court refused to allow the testimony of a mother‘s account of her
young daughter‘s statements that were made to her immediately after she came home after
being sexually abused. Id. He theorized that the majority would find the daughter‘s statements to her mother to be nontestimonial because they were ―made during an ongoing emergency.‖ Id. He stated:
[T]oday‘s majority presumably would hold the daughter‘s account to her
mother a nontestimonial statement made during an ongoing emergency.
She could not have known whether her attacker might reappear to attack
again or attempt to silence the lone witness against him. Her mother
likely listened to the account to assess the threat to her own safety and to
decide whether the rapist posed a threat to the community that required
the immediate intervention of the local authorities. Utter nonsense.
Id.
213
Id. In determining Covington‘s purpose, Justice Scalia believed that his statements
were made only to ensure the arrest and prosecution of Bryant. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170.
He also believed that Covington knew the threat ended when he fled from Bryant‘s house
some twenty-five minutes earlier because he knew that he was shot by ―a drug dealer, not a
spree killer who might randomly threaten others.‖ Id. Likewise, Justice Scalia found that
Covington‘s medical needs reinforced the testimonial nature of his statements because it is
likely that he knew that the police were focused on investigating the crime, not concentrating
on his medical needs. Id. at 1171.
214
Id. at 1168-69. Justice Scalia noted that only the declarant‘s intent matters. Id. at
1168. ―[T]he declarant must intend the statement to be a solemn declaration rather than an
unconsidered or offhand remark[,]‖ and he should make the statement with the understanding that it may be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168-69.
He did note, however, that the identity of the interrogator, together with the content and tone
of his questions may be relevant, but only because it may bear upon whether the declarant
intended to make a solemn statement which he understood could be used in a criminal trial.
Id. at 1169.
215
Id. Justice Scalia touched upon the question of how to assess whether a declarant with
diminished capacity has made testimonial statements, but noted that the question was not
raised in the case. Id. He commented that substituting the intentions of the police for those
of the declarant in these types of situations is wrong. Id. He noted: ―When the declarant has
diminished capacity, focusing on the interrogators make less sense, not more. . . . But a per-
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reintroducing the reliability factor back into the legal analysis.216 Justice Scalia concluded:
Judicial decisions, like the Constitution itself, are
nothing more than parchment barriers. Both depend
on a judicial culture that understands its constitutionally assigned role, has the courage to persist in that role
when it means announcing unpopular decisions, and
has the modesty to persist when it produces results
that go against the judges‘ policy preferences. Today‘s opinion falls far short of living up to that obligation—short on the facts, and short on the law.
For all I know, Bryant has received his just
deserts. But he surely has not received them pursuant
to the procedures that our Constitution requires. And
what has been taken away from him has been taken
away from us all.217
IV.

DECISIONS IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
PRIOR TO MICHIGAN V. BRYANT
A.

Children’s Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecution Cases Following Ohio v. Roberts

Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Roberts, admission of children‘s hearsay statements in criminal prosecutions would
not violate a defendant‘s right to confrontation provided the statements bore adequate ―indicia of reliability.‖218 Additionally, courts
could infer reliability if the hearsay fell ―within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.‖219 The two hearsay exceptions that were routinely
son who cannot perceive his own purposes certainly cannot perceive why a listener might be
interested in what he has to say.‖ Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1169.
216
Id. at 1176. Justice Scalia noted this is at direct odds with the decision in Crawford in
which the Court stated: ― ‗Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.‘ ‖ Id. at 1174 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69). He questioned whether the majority intended to resurrect the Roberts decision ―by a thousand unprincipled distinctions without ever explicitly overruling Crawford?‖ Id. at 1175.
217
Id. at 1176 (internal quotations omitted).
218
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
219
Id.
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applied to children‘s hearsay statements in cases of child sexual
abuse were the excited utterance exception and the exception for
statements made in connection with medical diagnosis and treatment.220 Courts have also admitted children‘s statements under the
residual or catchall exceptions to the hearsay rule.221
The vast majority of reported cases dealing with the medical
diagnosis and treatment exception involve child sexual abuse, although prosecutions of these crimes comprise only a small percentage of criminal cases.222 There are several issues that arise in connection with the use of this hearsay exception. The first issue is
whether the proponent of the evidence should be required to demonstrate a connection between a declarant‘s motivation for making the
statements and the circumstances surrounding the examination and
treatment. Some jurisdictions freely admit children‘s statements regarding sexual abuse without requiring any connection between the
treatment and the children‘s appreciation of the purpose for the
treatment, while others do not.223 Another issue that arises in connection with this hearsay exception, since the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not provide a definition of medical treatment or diagnosis, is what
is properly included within the meaning of treatment or diagnosis.224
There are also concerns surrounding the use of this exception for the
treatment of psychological maladies.225
The most significant issue on which courts have disagreed is
whether children‘s statements, made in connection with a physical
examination in which they identified their perpetrator, are admissible
under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay
rule.226 These types of identifying statements can be particularly da220
See Wright, 497 U.S. at 820 (explaining, in general, the rationale for the excited utterance and medical treatment hearsay exceptions).
221
See id. at 816 (discussing the Idaho trial court‘s use of the residual evidence exception
in admitting hearsay declarations of a two and a half year old sexual abuse victim).
222
Robert P. Mosteller, Children as Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Trial Process:
The Maturation and Disintegration of the Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 47, 56 (2002).
223
Id. at 51-52. The traditional justification for this exception is based on the idea that
patients have a selfish treatment interest in providing truthful information to the physician
along with the fact that they expect that the physician will rely on the information in diagnosing and treating them. Id.
224
Id. at 47-48.
225
Id. at 54.
226
See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that
statements identifying a child‘s assailant ―would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related‖ to
diagnosis or treatment). But see United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 (10th
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maging to defendants because they may be the only statement identifying the defendant as the abuser if the child is unable to testify.227
Furthermore, even if the children testify, these hearsay statements are
often more detailed than their actual testimony and therefore more
powerful.228 Finally, these statements can be particularly harmful if
used as corroborating evidence because they can sway the jury
towards conviction and be viewed merely as harmless error on
appeal.229
Courts that have held that these statements of identification
are not covered by the medical treatment or diagnosis exception cite
to the Advisory Committee‘s Note to Federal Rule of Evidence
803(4), which indicates that statements of cause will qualify under
the rule, whereas statements of fault will not.230 The Committee Note
provides the following example: ―[A] patient‘s statement that he was
struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that the
car was driven through a red light.‖231 Under this rationale, children‘s statements describing the abuse are statements related to cause
and relevant to proper diagnosis and treatment; whereas children‘s
statements identifying the perpetrator are statements of fault and not
medically pertinent.
Courts that have allowed children‘s hearsay statements of
identification, made in connection with medical diagnosis or treatment, have justified their decisions on varying grounds. Some courts
have viewed children‘s identification of their perpetrator to be relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment, reasoning that this information could provide a possible source of sexually transmitted disease
or pregnancy, even in the absence of evidence to suggest these factors
are at issue in the case.232 Other courts have reasoned that children‘s
Cir. 2000).
227
Mosteller, supra note 222, at 60-61.
228
Id. at 61.
229
Id.
230
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee‘s note.
231
Id.
232
See, e.g., People v. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 1992). The court adopted an
expansive interpretation of ‗diagnosis and treatment‘ and, based on this, found that identification of a child‘s assailant could be important to the health of a child if the child has contracted a sexually transmitted disease and identification may be necessary for the assessment
of pregnancy and in vitro problems related to genetic characteristics. Id. at 629. It also
commented that treatment of a sexually abused child has psychological and developmental
components that must be addressed. Id. The court found that identification of the assailant
was necessary for treatment because when the physician learned that the assailant lived in
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identification of their perpetrator was necessary because a doctor has
an ethical responsibility to assure that any future contact between the
child and perpetrator is eliminated if the perpetrator is a member of
the child‘s household.233 Still others have opined that identification
was medically related because it was relevant to the psychological
well-being of the child.234 These latter two reasons appear more appropriately rooted in social welfare concerns than medical concerns
and demonstrate how the medical treatment exception, as applied to
child abuse prosecutions, has been clearly ―stretched beyond the
bounds of its theoretical justification.‖235
Moreover, other courts, following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Ohio v. Roberts,236 have given less consideration to establishing a connection between children‘s statements and the reason for the
medical treatment and have instead focused principally on determining whether the statements were inherently trustworthy.237 The Michigan Supreme Court‘s decision in People v. Meeboer238 exemplifies
the victim‘s home, he ―began her future treatment by alerting the authorities.‖ Id. at 631.
233
Mosteller, supra note 222, at 63; see, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 72 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Ark.
2002) (finding that disclosure of the identity of the perpetrator allowed the physician to fulfill her duty to report the abuse to state authorities).
234
Mosteller, supra note 222, at 50-51, 63.
235
Id. at 47, 65.
236
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
237
See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 309-19 (3rd
ed. 2009) (discussing Mississippi and New Hampshire statutes that require a court to find a
child‘s statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment to also be ―made
under circumstances indicating their trustworthiness‖).
238
484 N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 1992). In this case, the court consolidated three cases for review. Id. at 622. The first case, People v. Conn, involved a seven-year-old who was taken
by her mother to a physician two days after she complained of pain in her vaginal area. Id.
at 630. During the examination, and in response to questioning by the physician, she identified the defendant, who had been residing in her home, as the one who had sexually assaulted her. Id. She initially told the doctor that she fell on her bicycle and that a ―boy‖ had
been ― ‗messing‘ with her.‖ Id. at 623. After repeated questioning she identified the defendant as her assailant. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 623, 630. Following the examination, the
physician contacted law enforcement authorities. Id. at 623. The defendant was charged
with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. Id. The complainant testified at trial and
identified the defendant as her assailant. Id. The physician‘s testimony corroborated the
complainant‘s testimony. See id. (detailing procedures leading to defendant‘s conviction
using victim‘s testimony and physician‘s expert testimony; the issue in the case was whether
the physician‘s testimony was based on hearsay). In the first of the three cases, the court
held that the complainant‘s statements were trustworthy based on ―circumstantial evidence
of her understanding of the need to be truthful,‖ even though the child had given inconsistent
statements of identification. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 630.
In People v. Meeboer, a six-year-old girl reported that the defendant sexually assaulted
her while she was visiting his home, eleven days prior. Id. at 624. She was taken to the hos-
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this approach.239 The court, citing Idaho v. Wright,240 examined the
totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether the children‘s statements ― ‗possess[ed the necessary] indicia of reliability [to
be deemed admissible] by virtue of [their] inherent trustworthiness.‘
‖241 In doing so, it identified numerous factors to consider in making
this determination, including: (1) whether the child understood the
need to tell the truth; (2) the age and maturity of the child; (3) the
child‘s use of age appropriate language; (4) the party initiating the
examination; and (5) whether there is a motive on the part of the
child to fabricate.242
pital by her mother, where she was examined by Dr. Karen Bentley, a specialist in child sexual abuse and a member of the child sexual abuse team at the hospital. Id. at 624, 631. The
record indicated that the family had reported the incident to the police prior to the examination and that Dr. Bentley was aware of the suspected abuse prior to her examination of the
complainant. Id. at 631. She concluded that sexual abuse had occurred and promptly reported this information to the authorities. Id. at 624. At trial, Dr. Bentley testified about the
physical evidence of sexual abuse and the complainant‘s identification of the defendant as
her abuser. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 624. The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness in the child‘s statements in the second case, yet in this case, it based
its conclusion on the lack of evidence in the record. Id. at 631. Yet, the court found that
there was no evidence that the child had fabricated the story; there was no evidence to explain how the child seemed to understand the nature of sexual intercourse; there was no evidence of the use of leading questions; and even though the allegations had been reported to
the police and the physician before the examination, it found: ―there is no indication that the
examination was a pretext for an investigation.‖ Id.
In the third case, People v. Craft, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting
his four-year-old stepdaughter. Id. at 625. The action originated from reports that the
child‘s teachers had made to child protective services. Id. The complainant‘s mother took
her to a physician four days after her teachers filed their report. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at
625. Following the examination, the doctor concluded that she had been sexually abused
and reported his findings and conclusions to the authorities. Id. The child was removed
from her home and placed in foster care. Id. However, she had made some conflicting
statements to Dr. Cooke at one point telling him that someone other than the defendant had
touched her two months later. Id. Complainant‘s foster mother took her to see a different
physician who examined her and who also noticed physical signs of sexual abuse. Id. During this examination, the young child identified the defendant as her abuser. Meeboer, 484
N.W.2d at 625. The court found that there was not sufficient evidence of trustworthiness to
support the admissibility of the child‘s statements. Id. at 633. In reaching its conclusion, the
court relied on the fact that the child was only four years old and had been removed from her
home at the time she identified the defendant as her abuser, coupled with the active participation of investigative authorities prior to the physical examination. Id. at 632-33.
239
Id. at 621.
240
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
241
Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 626 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 822).
242
Id. at 627 (―Factors related to trust-worthiness guarantees surrounding the actual making of the statement include: (1) the age and maturity of the declarant, (2) the manner in
which the statements are elicited (leading questions may undermine the trustworthiness of a
statement), (3) the manner in which the statements are phrased (childlike terminology may
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Another frequently employed exception to the hearsay rule in
child sexual abuse prosecutions is the residual or catchall exception
which allows the admission of hearsay statements that possess ―circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness‖ provided the court finds:
―(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.‖243 This exception has been applied to allow the admission
of children‘s statements to social workers and other professionals
outside of the medical field.244 In People v. Katt,245 the court found
that statements made by a seven-year-old boy to a child-protectiveservices worker, following a report of suspected abuse in which he
described his abuse and named the defendant as his abuser, were admissible.246
The Michigan Supreme Court found that one of the requirements embodied in the residual exception, that the statements have
―circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,‖247 was in line with the
be evidence of genuineness), (4) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, (5)
who initiated the examination (prosecutorial initiation may indicate that the examination was
not intended for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment), (6) the timing of the examination in relation to the assault (the child is still suffering pain and distress), (7) the timing of
the examination in relation to the trial (involving the purpose of the examination), (8) the
type of examination (statements made in the course of treatment for psychological disorders
may not be as reliable), (9) the relation of the declarant to the person identified (evidence
that the child did not mistake the identity), and (10) the existence of or lack of motive to fabricate.‖); see People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 24 (Mich. 2003) (listing fifteen non-inclusive
factors courts will consider in determining reliability).
243
The Federal Residual Exception, Federal Rule of Evidence 807 also provides:
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless
the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent‘s intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
FED. R. EVID. 807.
244
See, e.g., United States v. Grooms, 978 F.2d 425, 427-28 (8th Cir. 1992) (admitting
statements made by young girls to an FBI agent under the residual exception to the hearsay
rule).
245
662 N.W.2d 12 (Mich. 2003).
246
Id. at 14-15.
247
Id. at 23. The court referred to fifteen factors that courts have found to be relevant in
evaluating the trustworthiness of statements, citing Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, Matthew Bender & Co. Inc. 2002 §807.02(4). Id. at 24. These factors are:
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requirements of the Confrontation Clause.248 In this case, the court
(1) The relationship between the declarant and the person to whom the
statement was made. For example, a statement to a trusted confidante
should be considered more reliable than a statement to a total stranger.
(2) The capacity of the declarant at the time of the statement. For instance, if the declarant [were] drunk or on drugs at the time, that would
cut against a finding of trustworthiness . . . .
(3) The personal truthfulness of the declarant. If the declarant is an untruthful person, this cuts against admissibility, while an unimpeachable
character for veracity cuts in favor of admitting the statement. The government cannot seriously argue that the trust due an isolated statement
should not be colored by compelling evidence of the lack of credibility
of its source: although a checkout aisle tabloid might contain unvarnished truth, even a devotee would do well to view its claims with a
measure of skepticism.
(4) Whether the declarant appeared to carefully consider his statement.
(5) Whether the declarant recanted or repudiated the statement after it
was made.
(6) Whether the declarant has made other statements that were either
consistent or inconsistent with the proffered statement.
(7) Whether the behavior of the declarant was consistent with the content
of the statement.
(8) Whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the event or condition described.
(9) Whether the declarant‘s memory might have been impaired due to
the lapse of time between the event and the statement.
(10) Whether the statement, as well as the event described by the statement, is clear and factual, or instead is vague and ambiguous.
(11) Whether the statement was made under formal circumstances or
pursuant to formal duties, such that the declarant would have been likely
to consider the accuracy of the statement when making it.
(12) Whether the statement appears to have been made in anticipation of
litigation and is favorable to the person who made or prepared the statement.
(13) Whether the declarant was cross-examined by one who had interests
similar to those of the party against whom the statement is offered.
(14) Whether the statement was given voluntarily or instead pursuant to
a grant of immunity.
(15) Whether the declarant was a disinterested bystander or rather an interested party.
Id. (alteration in the original).
248
Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 23. The court also stated that the Confrontation Clause prohibits
the use of corroborating evidence in criminal cases to determine the trustworthiness of
statements offered unless the declarant testifies at trial. Id. at 23-24. This appears to be at
odds with its decision three years earlier in Meeboer in which it held that that physical evidence of sexual abuse could be considered to determine the trustworthiness of the child‘s
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found the child‘s statements were trustworthy because they were
spontaneous; there was no evidence to indicate that the child had a
motive to fabricate, and he spoke in language that was appropriate for
his age.249 The court also found that the child‘s statements to the social worker were more probative than his testimony at trial because
there was less opportunity for him to be influenced by adults at the
time of his interview with the social worker than by the time of the
trial.250
B.

Children’s Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecution Cases Following Crawford v.
Washington and Davis v. Washington

The decision in Crawford dramatically altered the Court‘s
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and turned the law with respect
to children‘s hearsay statements, particularly in cases of child sexual
abuse, on its head. Whereas after Roberts, the test for admissibility
of these statements was whether they were inherently trustworthy or
bore ―adequate indicia of reliability,‖251 after Crawford, courts are
now required to determine if the hearsay statements were ―testimonial.‖252 A statement is testimonial if it was ― ‗made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.‘ ‖253
hearsay statements. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 627-28. However, the court clarified this discrepancy when it conditioned the consideration of this evidence on the declarant‘s testimony
at trial. Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 24. Because the declarant testified in Meeboer, the holding in
Katt did not overrule its previous one. Id.
The defendant also argued that MICH. R. EVID. 803A (Michigan‘s version of a ―tender
years‖ exception) ―covers the field‖ with respect to children‘s hearsay statements and that if
the statements were not admissible under this rule, they are not admissible under the residual
exception. Id. at 15-16. The court rejected this argument, noting that the majority of courts
that have decided this issue have rejected this ―near miss‖ theory. Id. at 20. The court held
that statements otherwise not admissible under one of the categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule may, nonetheless, be admissible under the residual exception provided they meet the
requirements of this rule. Id. at 21-23. In this case, the child‘s statements failed to meet the
requirements of MICH. R. EVID. 803A because his statements to the social worker were not
the first time that he raised his allegation of abuse, which is a requirement under Rule 803A.
Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 25.
249
Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 25.
250
Id.
251
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
252
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
253
Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for Nat‘l Ass‘n Criminal Def. Lawyers et. al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410) at *3).
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The objective witness test, with its focus on the declarant‘s
perspective, has caused havoc in the courts with respect to children‘s
hearsay statements. In the intervening period after the Crawford decision was handed down, but before the Court issued its opinion in
Davis, courts questioned whether the objective witness test could rationally be applied to young children.254 There was much disagreement over whether the reasonable person determination should be
made from the perspective of a mature witness or whether the statements should be viewed from a child‘s perspective.255
Courts that have examined the statements from a ―reasonable
child‘s‖ perspective have factored the child‘s age and cognitive abilities into the determination of whether a ―reasonable child‖ would
have understood the ramifications of his or her statements.256 For example, in a case before the Colorado Supreme Court, in which a
young child made statements to a physician in connection with a sexual assault examination, the court held that the child‘s age was a
―pertinent characteristic for analysis‖ in determining what an ―objectively reasonable child‖ would comprehend.257 In addition to considering the child‘s age, the court also analyzed the circumstances surrounding his statements.258 Based on this, the court found that an
objective seven-year-old child in the victim‘s position would have intended his statements to describe the source of his pain and symptoms; he would not have been able to comprehend that his statements
would be used in a subsequent criminal trial.259
254
Christopher Cannon Funk, The Reasonable Child Declarant After Davis v. Washington, 61 STAN. L. REV. 923, 936-38 (2009). The author includes a lengthy presentation of
cases that have addressed these issues. Id.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 939, 958.
257
People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 925-26 (Colo. 2006). The court also reviewed whether
the physician‘s interrogation of the child was the functional equivalent of a police interrogation. Id. at 922. The court held that it was not since the doctor was not a government official and, therefore the statements were not produced for the purpose of developing testimony
for trial. Id. at 924.
258
Id. at 926.
259
Id. The court also found that the fact that the examination was conducted in the doctor‘s offices with only the child, the doctor, and his mother present, lent further support to
the conclusion that the child would not foresee his statements being used in a later trial. Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926; see also State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006) (commenting that it is doubtful that a three-year-old child would be capable of understanding that
his statements would be used in a criminal prosecution); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d
393, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that a three-year-old child‘s out-of-court statements
to an examining physician would be testimonial only if the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statements would lead a ―three-year-old to reasonably believe her disclosures
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However, not all courts have agreed with the rationale
adopted by the Colorado Court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland,
in State v. Snowden,260 held that ―an objective test, using an objective
person, rather than an objective child of that age, is the appropriate
test for determining whether a statement is testimonial in nature.‖261
The American Prosecutors‘ Research Institute filed an amicus brief in
the appeal of this case and argued that a young child‘s statements
should never be testimonial given the ―limited cognitive and developmental skills of young children.‖262 The court rejected this argument stating:
Although we recognize that there may be situations
where a child may be so young or immature that he or
she would be unable to understand the testimonial nature of his or her statements, we are unwilling to conclude that, as a matter of law, young children‘s statements cannot possess the same testimonial nature as
those of other, more clearly competent declarants.263
The Snowden court expressed concern that the focus on the
―testimonial capacity of young children overlooks the fundamental
principles underlying the Confrontation Clause.‖264 It acknowledged
that while there are valid public policy reasons for limiting a child
victim‘s exposure to an emotionally disturbing courtroom experience,
courts ―must be faithful to the Constitution‘s deep concern for the
fundamental rights of the accused.‖265 The court found that the propwould be available for use at a later trial‖).
260
867 A.2d 314, 329 (Md. 2005). In this case, the trial court admitted the statements under Maryland‘s ―tender years‖ statute. Id. at 318-19. The statute allowed the prosecution to
introduce a health or social work professional‘s testimony as a substitute for that of a child
if, inter alia, the trial court interviews the child in a closed hearing and makes a finding on
the record that the child‘s statements possess ―specific guarantees of trustworthiness.‖ Id. at
319; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (West 2001).
261
Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329.
262
Id. at 328.
263
Id. at 328-29; see, e.g., People v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004) (involving a three
year-old-declarant); People ex rel R.A.S., 111 P.3d 487, 488 (Colo. App. 2004) (involving a
four-year-old declarant); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755-56 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (involving an eight-year-old victim and a four-year-old victim).
264
Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329.
265
Id. The court also noted that although the Supreme Court has recognized that the interest of protecting victims may trump some rights protected by the Confrontation Clause,
these interests may never prevail over the explicit guarantees of the Clause. Id. (citing Coy
v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-21 (1988)).
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er test for determining when a statement is testimonial should not only take into account the intentions of the declarant, but should also
look to the intentions of the person eliciting the statement.266 The
court noted that to do otherwise would allow the prosecution to freely
use statements by young children, which were made under circumstances in which the interrogators undoubtedly contemplated their use
at a later trial.267
The Maryland court‘s approach is the better reasoned one. It
is illogical to apply the Crawford test, which was formulated with
adult declarants in mind to young children, who unlike Sylvia Crawford, may for all intents and purposes be incapable of understanding
the serious legal consequences that may occur as a result of their
statements.268 Moreover, ascertaining what a child intended, requires
a determination of what is ―artificial or unknowable.‖269 Furthermore, because it is easy for courts to reach the conclusion that a child
is too young to form the necessary intent, it provides prosecutors a
free pass to have these statements admitted, as the Maryland Court
recognized.270
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Davis altered the Crawford
test by shifting the focus of the analysis from the objective intentions
of the declarant to a ―primary purpose‖ test.271 Under this test, statements are ―testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate
that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖272 Further, under the primary
purpose test, courts can consider not only the declarant‘s intent, but
also the intentions of a ―reasonable listener.‖273
In the period following the Davis decision, some courts have
substituted the primary purpose test with the reasonable child test, but
only in instances involving certain classes of listeners.274 The rea266

Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7).
Id. at 329.
268
See Mosteller, supra note 66, at 943 (stating that the children‘s explanations of the
crime did not vary based on who they were speaking to, regardless of being in a testimonial
or non-testimonial setting).
269
Id. at 970.
270
Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329.
271
Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
272
Id. at 822.
273
Id. at 827.
274
Funk, supra note 254, at 940.
267
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sonable child test continues to be applied in cases involving children‘s statements to parents, family members, caretakers, friends, and
other private individuals. With a few exceptions, courts have found
these statements to be nontestimonial.275 The fact that children‘s
statements to such individuals tend to be spontaneous may have led
these courts to conclude that a reasonable child would not comprehend that his or her statements would be used at trial.276 Even so, the
courts that have applied the primary purpose test from the perspective
of the listener have reached the same conclusion that such statements
are nontestimonial, but on the grounds that the parents were motivated by the health and welfare of the child as opposed to a need to
preserve evidence for use at a subsequent trial.277
With respect to statements that children made to persons other
than the individuals mentioned in the categories addressed above,
courts have continued to consider the age and cognitive abilities of a
child, but they have drawn a clear line when dealing with children‘s

275

Id. at 942-43.
Mosteller, supra note 66, at 944-45; see also State v. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21, 25 (N.C.
App. 2005). Brigman involved children‘s statements that were solicited by the foster mother
after observing the children engaging in sexually oriented behavior. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d at
22. Following a call to the state social service agency, she continued her questioning of the
children. Id. She also attempted to tape record the statements. Id. The court found the
children‘s statements to be nontestimonial because given the age of the children, they would
not have anticipated that their statements would be used in a criminal trial. Id. at 25-26.
However, there are a few courts that have found this category of statements to raise Confrontation Clause concerns. State v. Spencer, 169 P.3d 384, 389-90 (Mont. 2007); People v.
Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 345 (Ill. 2007); In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1030-31 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005), vacated on other grounds, 863 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. 2006). In one such case, the court
found a child‘s statements to her grandmother to be testimonial because they were accusatory in nature. In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d at 1035-36. The court stated:
Although some uncertainty remains regarding the exact definition
of ―testimonial statements,‖ we are certain that, in this case, B.R.‘s
statement to her grandmother falls within the purview of the ruling of
Crawford and is governed by the protections of the confrontation clause.
It is true that certain types of hearsay statements, i.e., ―an offhand, overheard remark,‖ may not qualify as statements at which the confrontation
clause was directed, but it does apply against ―those who bear testimony.‖ Here, the declarant, B.R., bore accusatory testimony against E.H.
which was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, specifically,
that E.H. sexually assaulted her.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Additionally, Justice Scalia‘s use of Brasier in his opinions in Davis and Bryant suggest that
he would view the child‘s statements as raising Confrontation Clause concerns. See Davis,
547 U.S. at 828; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173.
277
Mosteller, supra note 66, at 947-48.
276
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statements to law enforcement personnel.278 After Davis, the majority of courts that have applied the primary purpose test to children‘s
statements to law enforcement personnel, have placed the focus of
the analysis squarely on the intent of the questioner.279 Courts have
also applied this approach even where the questioning was not conducted by police officers, if they found that the questioning was the
functional equivalent of a police interrogation.280 In determining
whether questioning is the functional equivalent of a police interrogation, courts consider the amount of law enforcement participation in
the interview, specifically whether law enforcement personnel appeared to direct or control the questioning.281
In cases involving children‘s statements to physicians and
counselors following the Davis decision, some courts, employing the
primary purpose test, have concluded that the children‘s statements
were nontestimonial on the grounds that the primary purpose of the
interrogation was treatment or diagnosis.282 Other courts have
reached opposite conclusions.283 More difficult questions are raised
278

Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 359. The court stated, ―We believe that [outside the context of
police interrogation] the only proper focus is on the declarant‘s intent: Would the objective
circumstances have led a reasonable person to conclude that their statement could be used
against the defendant?‖ Id. It also stated, ―[T]he better view is to treat the child‘s age as one
of the objective circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether a reasonable
person in his or her circumstances would have understood that their statement would be
available for use at a later trial.‖ Id. at 363.
279
Funk, supra note 254, at 940. The Supreme Court of Illinois has noted: ―[W]hen the
statements under consideration are the product of questioning by the police (or those whose
‗acts [are] acts of the police‘), we must focus on the intent of the questioner in eliciting the
statement.‖ Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 357 (alteration in the original).
280
Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329-30.
281
See Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 756-58; Mack, 101 P.3d at 352; In re Rolandis G., 902
N.E.2d 600, 611 (Ill. 2008).
282
See, e.g., Spencer, 169 P.3d at 388-90 (holding that statements by a three-year-old to
her parent and licensed counselor were not testimonial because the primary purpose of the
statements was parenting and counseling); Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203, 209-10 (Wyo. 2008)
(finding that the primary purpose of a young child‘s statements to a psychiatrist was diagnosis and treatment; therefore the statements were not testimonial).
283
See, e.g., Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329-30. The Maryland Court of Appeals found that
although there might have been a therapeutic element to a child‘s interview with a social
worker, this did not disguise the fact that interviews were designed to develop testimony that
would likely be used at trial. Id. The court stated:
Crawford’s command in this regard is clear. No matter what other motives exist, if a statement is made under such circumstances that would
lead an objective person to believe that statements made in response to
government interrogation later would be used at trial, the admission of
those statements must be conditioned upon Crawford’s requirements of
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
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in cases where the professionals involved have mixed motives or
mixed intentions when questioning children.
In recent years, state governments, encouraged by the Department of Justice, have established multidisciplinary teams to respond to the problems of child sexual abuse.284 These teams generally consist of social workers, therapists, physicians, prosecutors, and
police officers who perform dual roles. These multidisciplinary
teams have been successful in improving the skills of the individuals
that interrogate children and in reducing the number of interviews
that children are being subjected to.285 While there is little doubt that
these practices serve important state interests, the statements procured as the result of these interviews face serious Confrontation
Clause challenges.
Courts have adopted a variety of approaches in determining
the primary purpose of interrogations in cases involving children‘s
statements procured under these types of circumstances. Some courts
have held that statements to non-government personnel are, by their
very nature, nontestimonial.286 For example, in People v. Geno,287
the defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his girlfriend‘s
two-year-old daughter.288 The child‘s father contacted Children‘s
Protective Services after he noticed physical signs of sexual abuse.289
The agency arranged for an assessment and interview of the child by
the Children‘s Assessment Center.290 In response to questioning by
the executive director of the Center as to whether the child ―had an
owie,‖ pointing to her vaginal area, she answered, ―[Y]es, Dale [de-

Id. at 330.
284
Raeder, supra note 1, at 381.
285
John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical
Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 17 (1996).
Data has suggested that reducing the number of interviews that young children are subjected
to eliminates stress and decreases the likelihood that suggestive questions will be directed at
the child. Id.
286
See Vigil, 127 P.3d at 924 (holding that because the doctor was not a government official, the statements were not produced for the purpose of developing testimony for trial).
287
683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
288
Id. at 689.
289
Id.
290
Id. The Children‘s Assessment Center in Grand Rapids, Michigan indicates that it
provides assessment services, forensic interviewing, law enforcement, Children‘s Protective
Services, and noninvasive medical exams. Children‘s Assessment Center, Hearing the Story, CHILD. ASSESSMENT CTR., www.cac-kent.org/hearing_the_story.php (last visited Jan. 3,
2012).
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fendant] hurts me here.‖291 The trial court allowed the admission of
the child‘s statements under the residual exception to the hearsay
rule.292
On review, the appellate court found that the child‘s statements to the forensic interviewer were nontestimonial simply because
they were made to a non-governmental employee.293 The court did
not address the fact that the child identified her abuser in her statements, it did not question the nature or purpose of the interrogation,
nor did it discuss the fact that Children‘s Protection Services arranged
for the assessment after the report of sexual abuse had been made. It
simply concluded:
The child‘s statement was made to the executive director of the Children‘s Assessment Center, not to a government employee, and the child‘s answer to the question whether she had an ―owie‖ was not a statement in
the nature of ―ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent.‖294
Other courts have found children‘s statements to be nontestimonial provided there was some evidence of a non-prosecutorial purpose.295 The scant protection that confrontation rights can receive
when courts strive to find a health and welfare purpose to the questioning, as distinct from a law enforcement purpose, is evidenced in
the Minnesota Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Bobadilla.296
In Bobadilla, the court held that a child‘s videotaped statement, given in response to questioning by a social worker, was nontestimonial despite the fact that the interview was performed at the
police department and in the presence of a police detective.297 The
defendant argued that the statements were testimonial because the interviews were conducted pursuant to a state statutory scheme that was
created specifically for the purpose of investigating and responding to

291

Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 689.
Id. at 690. Defendant did not raise a constitutional objection to the admissibility of this
evidence at trial; hence, it was not properly preserved for appeal. Id. In light of this, the
Court of Appeals reviewed his argument for plain error. Id.
293
Id. at 692.
294
Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 692.
295
See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 237, at 310.
296
709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006).
297
Id. at 257.
292
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child abuse and neglect.298 The court rejected this argument and instead found that the principal purpose of the statutory scheme was to
―protect the health and welfare of children.‖299 Three years later, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in upholding a federal district court‘s order granting a writ of habeas corpus to Bobadilla,
found that the Minnesota Supreme Court ―unreasonably applied‖ the
U.S. Supreme Court‘s holding in Crawford v. Washington.300 The
Eighth Circuit found that the child‘s statements were testimonial because (1) the interviews were initiated by the police, (2) the purpose
of the interview was to further the police investigation because the
social worker conducted the questioning at the request of the police
officer, and (3) the interview was not conducted until five days after
the allegations of abuse were raised.301 The court concluded:
[T]he interview . . . was initiated by a police officer to
obtain statements for use during a criminal investigation, was recorded so further law enforcement interviews would be unnecessary, and involved structured
questioning designed to confirm a prior allegation of
abuse. No one disputes [that if the detective] . . . conducted the questioning, such statements would be testimonial under Crawford. It was unreasonable for the
Minnesota Supreme Court to conclude just because
[the detective] requested another government agent to
ask the same questions in order to achieve the same
purpose, the result is different.302
Along the same lines, children‘s statements made during forensic interviews in sexual abuse clinics or advocacy centers have
been found to be testimonial.303 In fact, the majority of jurisdictions
that have ruled on this issue have found children‘s statements, made
under these conditions, to be testimonial.304 The Supreme Court of
298

Id. at 254.
Id.
300
Bobadilla v. Carlson, 575 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2009).
301
Id. at 791.
302
Id. at 793.
303
See, e.g., Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 333 (finding that a child‘s statements to a mandated
reporter were testimonial); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 2006) (finding that a child‘s
statements to a state Child Protection Worker were testimonial); Mack, 101 P.3d at 349
(finding that a child‘s statements to a state caseworker were testimonial).
304
In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d at 611.
299
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Illinois, in In re Rolandis G.,305 held that statements made by a sevenyear-old to a child abuse investigator employed by a licensed advocacy center were testimonial.306 In reaching its decision, the court relied on the fact that the child advocate worked in concert with other
agencies involved in the investigation and prosecution of child sexual
abuse and was obligated, by statute, to share information with the police.307 The court stated:
We are not unsympathetic to the State‘s concern that
child abuse victims are often unavailable to testify because of their tender years and, for that reason, ―Crawford is incompatible with the realities of child abuse
prosecutions.‖ However, the Court in Davis, when
faced with a similar argument in regard to victims of
domestic violence, stated, ―We may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free.‖ Thus here, too,
we may not abridge constitutional guarantees simply
because they are a hindrance to the prosecution of
child sexual abuse crimes.308
More recently, in People v. Spangler,309 a Michigan court was
asked to decide whether a young boy‘s statements, made to a Sexual
Abuse Nurse Examiner (―SANE‖)310 who performed a forensic ex305

902 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 2008).
Id. at 613.
307
Id.
308
Id. The court also found the following facts relevant: The defendant was not charged
until after the interview with the child took place, and the police had retained a copy of the
videotaped interview as evidence that the child was not in any danger from the defendant at
the time of the interview. Id.; see also Hernandez v. Florida, 946 So.2d 1270, 1282-83 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the questions of a nurse who was a member of a Child Protection Team at a hospital were the functional equivalent of a police interrogation); State v.
Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 567 (N.D. 2006) (finding that a child‘s videotaped interview with a
forensic interviewer at the Child Advocacy Center was testimonial); Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 758 (finding that a child victim‘s videotaped interview at the county facility designed
and staffed for interviewing children victims of sexual abuse was testimonial); Contreras v.
State, 910 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding testimonial a videotaped
statement given by a thirteen-year-old to a coordinator of the state‘s child protection team
where a sheriff was connected electronically in another room).
309
774 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
310
SANE – Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, ALLNURSES, http://allnurses.com/forensicnursing/sexual-assault-nurse-152900.html (last updated May 8, 2007, 8:39 AM). The role of
the SANE includes the following functions: ―Perform a physical examination on the victim,
[c]ollect evidence, [t]reat minor injuries such as cuts/bruises, [e]xpert testimony regarding
306
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amination, were testimonial.311 The court engaged in a lengthy discussion of decisions rendered by courts in other states and noted that
the majority of courts have found statements made under these types
of circumstances to be testimonial.312 The court presented a series of
factors that other courts have considered important in making this determination.313 However, the court ultimately found that the record
was insufficiently developed to allow it to make the necessary findings.314 It remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to develop the record in accordance with its rulings.315

the forensic evidence collected, [s]erve on a SANE response team (SART), [w]ork closely
with law enforcement agencies and the prosecutor‘s office, [s]upport the psychological needs
of the victim.‖ Id.
311
Spangler, 774 N.W.2d at 704.
312
Id. at 709-12.
313
Id. at 713. The factors are:
(1) The reason for the victim‘s presentation to the SANE, e.g., to be
checked for injuries or for signs of abuse; (2) the length of time between
the abuse and the presentation; (3) what, if any, preliminary questions
were asked of the victim or the victim‘s representative, or what preliminary conversations took place, before the official interview or examination; (4) where the interview or examination took place, e.g., a hospital
emergency room, another location in the hospital, or an off-site location;
(5) the manner in which the interview or examination was conducted; (6)
whether the SANE conducted a medical examination and, if so, the extent of the examination and whether the SANE provided or recommended any medical treatment; (7) whether the SANE took photographs or
collected any other evidence; (8) whether the victim‘s statements were
offered spontaneously, or in response to particular questions, and at what
point during the interview or examination the statements were made; (9)
whether the SANE completed a forensic form during or after the interview or examination; (10) whether the victim or the victim‘s representative signed release or authorization forms, or was privy to any portion of
the forensic form, before or during the interview or examination; (11)
whether individuals other than the victim and the SANE were involved
in the interview or examination and, if so, the level of their involvement;
(12) if and when law enforcement became involved in the case, how they
became involved and the level of their involvement; and (13) how
SANEs are used by the particular hospital or facility where the interview
or examination took place.
Id.
314
Id. at 714.
315
Spangler, 774 N.W.2d at 714.
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THE IMPACT OF MICHIGAN V. BRYANT ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S HEARSAY
STATEMENTS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
PROSECUTIONS
A.

The Significant Portions of the Bryant Opinion

Bryant affirmed the primary purpose test that the Court set out
in Davis along with its holding that statements are testimonial when
the ―primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖316 The factors that are important to the determination of the primary purpose of
an interrogation are the intentions of the declarant and the listener,
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation including whether
the statements were made during an ongoing emergency, and the role
of the interrogator.317
The Bryant Court affirmed the Davis Court‘s requirement that
courts apply an objective standard in determining whether statements
are testimonial.318 In determining the primary purpose of an interrogation, courts should ascertain ―the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals‘ statements
and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.‖319 However, the Bryant Court changes from whose perspective this objective standard is applied. While Crawford placed the
focus of the inquiry squarely on the declarant and Davis suggested
instances where it might be appropriate for courts to examine the intentions of the interrogators, Bryant appears to require that the interrogator‘s intent become a key element in the analysis.320 Moreover, it
seems to consider the interrogator‘s intent to be paramount in situations where the declarant is operating under a disability, such as the
gunshot victim in Bryant.321
The Bryant decision also altered the concept of what can constitute an ongoing emergency. It suggested that the duration of an
ongoing emergency can be quite long in cases involving guns and
316
317
318
319
320
321

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1154.
Id. at 1156-57.
Id. at 1156.
Id.
Id. at 1160-62.
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158-59.
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any possible, albeit negligible, threat to the public at large.322 Further, it clearly indicated that the duration of emergencies in domestic
violence cases will oftentimes be relatively short because they involve a known perpetrator and have a ―narrower zone of potential
victims than cases involving threats to public safety.‖323 It also suggested that an emergency ends when the perpetrator flees the scene of
the crime with little prospect of posing a threat to the public.324
With respect to the role of the interrogator in determining
whether a declarant‘s statements are testimonial, Crawford, Davis,
and Bryant all dealt with interrogations by law enforcement personnel, albeit under three distinct sets of circumstances.325 Whereas,
Crawford did not shut out the possibility that statements made outside the context of a police interrogation could be testimonial,326 Davis explicitly reserved for another time the question of ―whether and
when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are testimonial.‖327 However, the Court in Bryant clearly took
the position that the determination of whether a statement is testimonial is not limited to interrogations by law enforcement personal
when it stated that ―the most important instances in which the Clause
restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are those in which
state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a
witness to obtain evidence for trial.‖328
Finally, in what is the most disconcerting feature of the
Bryant opinion, the Court appeared to reintroduce the concept of reliability into its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.329 Without explanation, it stated that ―standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant‖ in determining the
primary purpose of an interrogation.330 However, it provided no
guidance as to how this rule should be interpreted or applied, nor did

322

Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1158.
324
Id. at 1159.
325
Id. (involving interrogations of a gunshot victim by police officers in a gas station
parking lot); Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (involving a 911 call and police interrogations of domestic
violence victims in their homes); Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (involving police interrogations of
defendant‘s spouse while she was in police custody).
326
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
327
Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2.
328
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (emphasis added).
329
Id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
330
Id. at 1155 (majority opinion).
323
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it explain how the reliability of hearsay statements is relevant to the
determination of the purpose of an interrogation.
B.

The Admissibility of Children’s Hearsay
Statements in Criminal Sexual Abuse Prosecutions
After Michigan v. Bryant

The U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Bryant significantly
impacts the admissibility of children‘s out of court statements in that
it increases the likelihood that the statements will be found to be testimonial, thereby decreasing the likelihood that they will be admitted
in criminal prosecutions. First, because of the Court‘s choice of the
phrase ―state actors,‖331 courts should no longer be able to find that
statements are nontestimonial solely on the grounds that they were
not made to law enforcement or government employees. Second, after Bryant, courts should be less likely to find that children‘s statements reporting sexual abuse are made during ongoing emergencies.
Lastly, the shift in focus from the declarant‘s intent to that of the interrogator, particularly in situations where the declarant is found to be
operating under a disability,332 should result in an increased number
of children‘s hearsay statements being found to be testimonial.
1.

Mandatory Reporters Are State Actors and
Should Be Included in the Category of
Individuals to Whom Testimonial Statements
Can Be Made

The Bryant Court indicated that a statement would be testimonial if made in situations ―in which state actors are involved in a
formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for
trial.‖333 The Court‘s use of the phrase ―state actors‖ is worthy of
note.334 It implies that the category of persons to whom testimonial
331

See id. at 1155.
Id. at 1161-62. What is uncertain is the effect that the Court‘s references to reliability
will have. Although it indicated that well-established hearsay exceptions could be considered in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation, how this should happen remains unclear.
333
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (emphasis added).
334
Id. It might be argued after Bryant that the Court‘s use of the phrase ―state actor‖ implies that statements made to parents, siblings or other family members or friends might not
be testimonial because these individuals would ordinarily not fall into the category of ―state
actor.‖ Id. However, the Court indicated that state actors would be involved in the ―most
332
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statements can be made is not limited to government employees, as
some courts have held.335
A private person can be a state actor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983336 when there is a ―sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the [private person] so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.‖337 This can
occur in cases in which a particular activity has been specifically authorized or sufficiently encouraged by the state.338 The U.S. Supreme
important instances‖ in which testimonial statements might be made. Id. Therefore it did
not exclude parents or other family members. Id.
335
See Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 692; Vigil, 127 P.3d at 923-24 (holding that a doctor, absent
direct and controlling police presence, is not acting as an agent for the government when
questioning a child victim during a medical examination).
336
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (allowing a cause of action against persons who act ―under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory‖). It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any state or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
337
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (citing Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)) (addressing the circumstances under which a private person has acted ―under color of law‖). Legal scholars have noted three general theories under
which ―courts have found a sufficient nexus to support state action: the public function test;
the government ‗entanglement‘ theory; and cases where there has been specific authorization
or [sufficient] encouragement‖ by the state of the particular activity. Sheila S. Kennedy,
When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L. J. 203, 210 (2001). Others have viewed the state-action
inquiry as being composed of two competing models. John Dorsett Niles et al., Making
Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 897 (2011) (citing G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 356 (1997)). Under the first model, referred to as the
―characterization model,‖ a court examines whether the conduct of the private actor can be
reasonably characterized as action by the state. Buchanan, supra. This question is generally
resolved through the nexus or public function test. Niles et al., supra. Under this test, state
action will be found when the private actor performs ―activities or functions which are traditionally associated with sovereign governments, and which are operated almost exclusively
by governmental entities.‖ 2 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 1010 (4th ed. 2007); see also Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (finding state action by the actions of a company in
owning and running a town on the grounds that this was a function traditionally and exclusively undertaken by the state); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (ruling that holding an election for a candidate for public office is a function traditionally reserved to the
state).
338
See, e.g., Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1963). This includes instances
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Court explained this principle in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn339: ―[A] State
normally can be held responsible for a private decision when it has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State.‖340 Importantly, when the government
mandates certain actions, through inter alia, legislation or administrative rules and regulations, a private person‘s compliance with these
requirements is state action.341 In Peterson v. City of Greenville,342
the Court found that actions by restaurant owners who discriminated
against their customers based on race was state action because existing state legislation commanded that restaurants serve food on a racially segregated basis.343 Furthermore, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co.,344 the Court stated: ―[A] State is responsible for the . . . act[s] of
a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.‖345
Individuals who are required to report suspected cases of
child abuse or neglect under state mandatory reporting statutes should
be included in the category of individuals to whom testimonial statements can be made, because they would likely be considered state actors under prevailing civil rights litigation jurisprudence.346 Every
state has laws mandating reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect.347 These statutes identify the category of professionals that are
required to report suspected abuse or neglect and the procedures to be

when the state takes affirmative steps to encourage or compel interaction between private
actors and the government. Id. In this model, termed the ―state authorization‖ model, the
court‘s inquiry focuses on the extent to which the state has authorized a private actor‘s behavior by ―placing the private actor in a position where the actor may ‗gouge‘ the challenger
with legal impunity.‖ Niles et al., supra note 337, at 897.
339
457 U.S. 830 (1982).
340
Id. at 840 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
341
Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 337, at 1010; see, e.g., Peterson, 373 U.S. at 247-48.
342
373 U.S. 244 (1963).
343
Id. at 247-48; see, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (applying
these principles). In Lugar, the Court held that a debtor could bring a § 1983 action challenging, on procedural due process grounds, a state procedure that allowed a creditor to secure an ex parte writ of attachment against the debtor‘s property. Id. at 941. The Court
found that the joint actions of the sheriff and the creditor, acting pursuant to a state statute,
constituted state action. Id. at 935. It explained that a private party can be a state actor when
―he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his
conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.‖ Id. at 937.
344
398 U.S. 144 (1970).
345
Id. at 170.
346
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (defining a state actor for purposes of civil rights claims).
347
Raeder, supra note 1, at 313.
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followed.348 For instance, Michigan‘s mandatory reporting statute
provides in pertinent part:
A physician, dentist, . . . nurse, . . . psychologist,
. . . social worker, . . . school counselor or teacher, . . .
member of the clergy, or regulated child care provider
who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or
neglect shall make immediately, by telephone or otherwise, an oral report, or cause an oral report to be
made, of the suspected child abuse or neglect to the
department. Within 72 hours after making the oral report, the reporting person shall file a written report as
required in this act.349
Prior to the Bryant decision, some courts were hesitant to find
that statements made to mandated reporters were testimonial. In a
case involving statements of abuse by a young boy to a physician, the
California Supreme Court rejected the defendant‘s argument that the
statements were testimonial even though the physician was obligated
by statute to report the abuse.350 The court stated: ―The mere fact that
doctors must report abuse they see, suspect or know of in the course
of practice does not transform them into investigative agents of law
enforcement.‖351
348
Id. at 374. The information that must be reported to the child protection agency is also
set forth in the statute which provides:
The written report shall contain the name of the child and a description of the abuse or neglect. If possible, the report shall contain the
names and addresses of the child‘s parents, the child‘s guardian, the persons with whom the child resides, and the child‘s age. The report shall
contain other information available to the reporting person that might establish the cause of the abuse of neglect, and the manner in which the
abuse or neglect occurred.
M.C.L. § 722.623(1)(c)(2) (2011).
349
Id. §722.623(1)(a). The full list of mandated reporters includes: ―physician[s], dentist[s], physician‘s assistant[s], registered dental hygienist[s], medical examiner[s], nurse[s],
person[s] licensed to provide emergency medical care, audiologist[s], psychologist[s], marriage and family therapist[s], licensed professional counselor[s], social worker[s], licensed
master‘s social worker[s], licensed bachelor‘s social worker[s], registered social service
technician[s], social service technician[s], person[s] employed in a professional capacity in
any office of the friend of the court, school administrator[s], school counselor[s] or teacher[s], law enforcement officer[s], member[s] of the clergy, or regulated child care provider[s]
. . . .‖ Id.
350
People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 218-20 (Cal. 2007).
351
Id. at 220. One author has argued that, although physicians are mandated reporters in
most jurisdictions, any statements made to them should not be testimonial because physi-
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Not all courts have agreed with the California court. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that a child‘s statements describing sexual abuse that were made to the nurse in charge of a child-abuse team
at a local hospital and to a social worker at her school were testimonial.352 It supported its conclusion by the fact that both of these
individuals were mandated reporters and therefore had a legal obligation under penalty of criminal law to report information to the child
protection agency.353 The court stated:
[B]y virtue of their status as mandated reporters
both [individuals] . . . were legally required to report
to the Department and then to testify, and the Department itself was also required to cooperate with law enforcement.354 These facts substantially buttress our
conclusion that in this case, in conducting their interviews of the victim, . . . [they] were acting as agents of
law enforcement for purposes of confrontation clause
analysis.355
The Bryant Court‘s use of the term ―state actor‖ suggests that
the cases in which courts have found children‘s statements to mandacians can never be considered to be agents of the government. Tom Harbinson, Crawford v.
Washington and Davis v. Washington‘s Originalism: Historical Arguments Showing Child
Abuse Victims’ Statements to Physicians are Nontestimonial and Admissible as an Exception
to the Confrontation Clause, 58 MERCER L. REV. 569, 616-17 (2007). The author argues that
physicians are not agents of the government because agency law requires a free choice on
the part of the agent in entering into the relationship with the principal, which is not present
in the case of mandatory reporting. Id. at 616-17. Additionally, a physician‘s ethical duty
requires that he act on behalf of the best interests of his patient and not on the part of the
government, which would be required by agency law. Id. at 618. Finally, there is no agreement between mandated reporters and the state nor is the physician under the control of the
government, two principles that are required under agency law. Id. The author also argued
that the fact that the interview is videotaped should not make statements testimonial. Id. at
629. He suggests that the purpose is simply to ―memorialize[e] the child‘s statements,‖ and
―allow[] the child‘s demeanor to be recorded on videotape.‖ Harbinson, supra at 628. However, he does not explain why a physician would be interested in preserving a record of the
child‘s demeanor, if not for potential use at subsequent criminal proceedings.
352
Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 363-65. In this case, her mother took the child to a hospital,
where she was interviewed by a nurse and subsequently examined by a physician. Id. at 339.
The school social worker interviewed the child the following day, after receiving a call from
the child‘s mother. Id. at 339-40; see also State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the fact that a teacher had a
duty to report a child‘s statement to law enforcement personnel as a pertinent factor in determining whether the statements were testimonial).
353
Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 365.
354
Id.
355
Id.
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tory reporters to be testimonial were correctly decided. Under the
prevailing mandated reporting statutes, it is clear that states have
commanded particular action from specifically named individuals.
States require these named individuals to file reports of suspected
cases of child abuse and neglect with law enforcement authorities.356
These statutes also prescribe criminal sanctions for failure to comply.357 Therefore, the actions of these private persons, in reporting
suspected cases of child abuse and neglect pursuant to these statutes,
are state action and the individuals involved are state actors.358 Following Bryant, courts should no longer be able to conclude that
statements made to this category of individuals are nontestimonial on
the grounds that they are not made to governmental employees.
2.

The Primary Purpose Test: The Scope of an
Ongoing Emergency

The Court‘s discussion of the factors that demonstrate an ongoing emergency, particularly the manner in which it distinguished
the circumstances in Bryant from those in Davis, will have a significant impact on the admissibility of children‘s statements in future
criminal prosecutions. The Court clearly stated that the duration of
an emergency in cases of domestic violence is far shorter than in other types of crimes.359 It is significant that the Court emphasized that
domestic violence cases have a narrower zone of potential victims
than those presented in Bryant; it is also significant that the Court
emphasized the fact that in both Davis and Hammon the perpetrator
was known to the victim.360 And it is noteworthy that in Hammon,
the Court found that the threat was neutralized once law enforcement
personnel arrived on the scene.361 Lastly, the Court‘s comments that
an emergency would end once the perpetrator flees the scene of the
356

M.C.L. § 722.623 (2011).
M.C.L. § 722.633 (2011).
358
Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 756-57 (2d Cir. 2000). Further, it is likely that legislatures contemplated this result when they provided a grant of immunity to persons acting in
conformity with the reporting statutes. See, e.g., M.C.L. § 722.625 (providing immunity
from civil or criminal liability for any ―person acting in good faith who makes a report, cooperates in an investigation, or assists in any other requirement of this act . . . . A person
making a report or assisting in any other requirement of this act is presumed to have acted in
good faith‖).
359
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158.
360
Id.; Davis, 547 U.S. at 832-33.
361
Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158.
357
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crime with little prospect of posing a threat to the public will prove to
be quite important for future cases to come because any statement
made after this point could be considered testimonial.362
If this reasoning is applied to child sexual abuse cases (and it
is likely that it will be given the analogous nature of domestic violence and sexual abuse crimes), the effect will be to significantly
limit the time frame during which children‘s statements can be found
to be nontestimonial. Prior to Bryant, some courts found that an ongoing emergency existed at the time a young child was taken to a
hospital for an examination following reports of sexual abuse.363
However, this finding will no longer align with the Bryant decision.
The perpetrator in a child sexual abuse case is more analogous to a
batterer in domestic violence cases than the armed gunman in Bryant.
In child sexual abuse cases, the perpetrator is generally known to the
victim since the vast majority of children are sexually abused by family members or friends.364 Additionally, like the perpetrators in
Hammon and Davis, the perpetrator in a child sexual abuse case generally does not present a threat to the public at large.
Furthermore, although some courts found an ongoing emergency in child sexual abuse cases when the perpetrator continued to
live in the same household as the child,365 going forward, these conclusions will also be difficult to square with the Bryant decision. In
analyzing the span of the emergency in Davis, the Bryant Court never
considered the very real possibility that an abusive partner is likely to
repeat his actions in the very near future. In reviewing Hammon, the
Court found that the emergency had ended even though the husband
never left the home.366 Moreover, the Bryant Court commented that
since the husband in Hammon was ―armed only with his fists when he
attacked his wife, . . . removing [her] to a separate room was sufficient to end the emergency.‖367 By analogy, in child sexual abuse
cases, removing the child victim from the physical presence of the
perpetrator would also end the emergency because, like the abusive
spouse in Hammon, a child molester is generally ―armed only with‖
362

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159; Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
See Seely v. State, 282 S.W.3d 778, 789-90 (Ark. 2008); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d
636, 641-42 (Minn. 2007).
364
Burch v. Millas, 663 F. Supp. 2d 151, 169 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
365
Id.
366
Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30.
367
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159 (emphasis added).
363
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his physical anatomy.
3.

The Primary Purpose Test: Considering the
Interrogator’s Intentions

The Bryant Court stated that in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation, courts should ascertain ―the purpose that
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals‘ statements and actions and the circumstances in which the
encounter occurred.‖368 Following Crawford, yet before the decision
of Bryant, with the focus of a court‘s inquiry centered on the intent of
the declarant, many courts felt free to find that children‘s statements
were nontestimonial on the grounds that a ―reasonable child‖ would
be unable to comprehend that his or her statements may be used in a
subsequent criminal trial.369 Thus, Bryant has shifted the focus to
consider the interrogator‘s intent especially in situations where the
declarant is operating under a disability. Therefore, resolution of
whether a young child‘s out-of-court statements are testimonial will
require a court to focus on the interrogator‘s intent. Because of this,
Bryant may also change the manner in which courts resolve cases in
which professionals who perform dual functions interrogate children.
For example, physicians perform dual roles in cases involving the
sexual abuse of children. They provide medical care, but because
they are mandated reporters, they also serve as investigators for the
state.370 In Michigan, physicians are required to report ―information
available to the reporting person that might establish the cause of the
abuse or neglect, and the manner in which the abuse or neglect occurred.‖371 These reporting requirements necessitate that physicians
perform investigatory functions, particularly with respect to the manner in which the abuse occurred, which include obtaining information
about the identity of the perpetrator and reporting this information to
state authorities.
Professor Robert Mosteller has commented that cases such as
these, in which the professionals have mixed motives and intentions,
―present[ ] a key test of whether the testimonial statement system has
368

Id. at 1156.
Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926.
370
State v. Goins, No. CA2000-09-190, 2001 WL 1525298, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3,
2001).
371
M.C.L. § 722.623(1)(c)(2).
369
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substance or only requires a precise articulation of another acceptable
purpose as an avoidance strategy.‖372 Courts that found a nontestimonial purpose for interrogations in situations where the professional
had mixed motives appear to have done so in an effort to achieve the
desired result from a policy perspective.373 However, in doing so,
these courts have produced opinions in which the law has been
stretched beyond its rational boundaries.374
In these types of cases, it is not necessary for courts to find
only one purpose behind an interrogation. Both Bryant and Davis
have recognized, at least with respect to ongoing emergencies, that
conversations that originate as an interrogation, whose main purpose
is to determine the need for emergency assistance, can develop into
testimonial statements.375 The same reasoning should apply to situations where an interrogator has mixed motives and intentions. For
example, questioning by a physician that begins with the need to obtain information from the child that is necessary for medical diagnosis or treatment can transform into testimonial statements. The interrogation becomes prosecutorial in nature once the medical status is
properly assessed. At this point, the purpose of any additional questioning shifts to ascertaining fault, particularly when the questions are
designed to elicit the identity of the perpetrator. In these cases, children‘s statements identifying their abusers should be considered to be
testimonial.376 The physician is a state actor, the circumstances under
which the statements are elicited are not likely to be considered an
ongoing emergency, and by inquiring into the identity of the perpetrator, the physician is engaging in the role of a state investigator.
Moreover, the physician has reason to know that the information he
or she obtains and reports to the law enforcement authorities will
likely be used at a subsequent trial.
Even more compelling arguments can be made that children‘s
statements obtained in response to questioning by SANEs or members of multidisciplinary teams that operate in hospitals and specia372

Mosteller, supra note 66, at 974.
Id. at 970-75 (noting that some courts that have found a nontestimonial purpose behind
interrogations of children have based their decision on finding that the questioning was motivated by concerns for the health and welfare of the child).
374
Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 692 (concluding that the child‘s statement to the executive director of a forensic center was not testimonial simply because the director was not a governmental employee).
375
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159.
376
Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926.
373
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lized clinics should be considered testimonial. Not only are these
professionals state actors but they are frequently so closely aligned
with law enforcement as to be considered an arm of law enforcement.
For example, one agency reports on its website that it engages in forensic interviewing conducted with other ―team members‖ observing
the interview via a one-way glass, and that it has three city police officers; two sheriff detectives; and four state child protection workers
housed at its facilities.377 It also reports that a pediatrician at the
agency performs physical exams and collects evidence in cases of
sexual abuse.378
Likewise after Bryant, children‘s statements reporting sexual
abuse made to employees of a state‘s child protection agency should
be found to be testimonial. It is routine practice for investigators employed by a state‘s child protection agency to question young children after the agency has received a report of suspected abuse.379 In
these situations, the child protection worker is a state actor, and although concerns for the child‘s welfare will have prompted the investigation, there is no doubt that there is also a prosecutorial purpose to
the questioning. In fact, the child protection agency is normally required to forward a copy of its investigation report to law enforcement in cases of child sexual abuse and to continue to work in tandem with the police departments and the county prosecutor‘s
office.380
In determining whether children‘s statements are testimonial,
when they are made in situations in which the interrogators have
mixed motives and intentions, the inquiry test should not focus on
whether there is some accompanying, nontestimonial reason for the
interrogation. Rather, the inquiry should focus on the investigative
role that these persons are performing and whether they have reason
to know that the information they obtain and report to law enforcement will likely be used in a subsequent criminal trial.

377

Children‘s Assessment Center, Hearing the Story, CHILD. ASSESSMENT CTR.,
www.cac-kent.org/hearing_the_story.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
378
Id.
379
The Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment, CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVS., http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/cps/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
380
See, e.g., M.C.L. § 722.623(c)(6).
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Recommendations

The testimonial approach to Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has been criticized as being ―intellectually and ethically bankrupt,‖381 particularly as it relates to children‘s hearsay statements.
Professor Eileen Scallen has commented that under the current state
of the law, out-of-court statements made by ―hysterical, unavailable
declarants whose ability to perceive, recall, and communicate key
facts is questionable‖ are admissible in criminal trials.382 Yet, ironically, videotaped interviews of children that are conducted by trained
investigators ―questioning a vulnerable child witness whose memory
will only likely deteriorate with time‖ will likely be excluded.383
There is certainly much truth to Professor Scallen‘s statements. Nonetheless, if the Confrontation Clause is to be accorded its due respect,
courts must require what the Clause demands: ―[that] the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against
him . . . .‖384
Unfortunately, issues of competency often arise when young
children are called as witnesses, which can prevent them from testifying at trial.385 Courts require a witness to be capable of discerning
truth from lies, willing and able to swear an oath or make some other
promise that he or she will testify truthfully, and capable of speaking
about the facts at issue.386 Although there is a rebuttable presumption
in Federal Rule of Evidence 601 that everyone is competent to testify,387 research suggests that some courts are hesitant to find children
competent to testify.388
Not only do courts differ in their positions on whether children are competent enough to testify under evidentiary rules, but they
also take different positions on what is required to constitute sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. The
381
Eileen A. Scallen, Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and Other Challenging Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558, 1607 (2009).
382
Id.
383
Id.
384
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
385
See Aviva A. Orenstein, Children as Witnesses: A Symposium on Child Competence
and the Accused’s Right to Confront Child Witnesses, 82 IND. L. J. 909 (2007).
386
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 741 (1987).
387
FED R. EVID. 601 (providing that witnesses are competent ―except as otherwise provided‖).
388
Scallen, supra note 381, at 1586 (citing Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young
Maltreated Children’s Competence to Take the Oath, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 16, 16-27 (1999)).
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Eighth Circuit has held that if a child is too young to be crossexamined or if she is too young or frightened to be subjected to a thorough cross-examination, ―the fact that she is physically present in
the courtroom should not, in and of itself, satisfy the demands of the
Clause.‖389 On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has set a low
threshold for determining a witness‘ availability for crossexamination purposes.390 In United States v. Owens,391 the Court held
that a witness is available for, and hence subject to cross-examination
for Confrontation Clause purposes, when he takes the stand, swears
an oath, and responds willingly to questions, although he may have
no memory of the events to which he was called to testify. 392 The
Court stated that ―the Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‗an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.‘ ‖393
In response to the hesitancy of some courts to find children
competent to testify, scholars have appealed to these courts to be
flexible in their approach to child witnesses.394 Professors Thomas
Lyon and Karen Saywitz from U.C.L.A. Medical Center have suggested that judges and advocates have inadvertently ―skew[ed] the
competency hearing results by the [manner in which] they frame the
questions‖ to young children.395 They have created alternative competency assessment tools for courts to employ that they believe will
improve the competency determinations of young children.396 These
alternative methods focus on determining whether a child can understand if statements are false and on the child‘s ability to communi389
United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1446 (8th Cir. 1986)). For an in depth discussion,
see Raeder, supra note 1, at 384-85.
390
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
391
Id. During the crime, the witness suffered amnesia from a blow to his head. Id. at 556.
At the time of the trial, he remembered that he had previously identified the defendant as his
assailant; however he could not remember seeing his assailant and was unable to recall details of the assault. Id.
392
Id. at 564.
393
Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,
20 (1985)).
394
Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1017, 1022 (2000).
395
Scallen, supra note 381, at 1587 (citing Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Qualifying Children to Take the Oath: Materials for Interviewing Professionals (May 2000), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=thomaslyon).
396
Id. (citing Lyon & Saywitz, supra note 395).
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cate.
If the lack of testimonial competency of a young child is due
to the child‘s inability to communicate with the jury, then courts have
flexibility under Maryland v. Craig397 to utilize alternative methods
to traditional testimony such as closed circuit televisions or screening
devices.398 These alternative procedures can improve a child‘s competency level by enhancing the child‘s ability to communicate with
the jury, and if used effectively, can operate to assure that more children will testify at trial.399 Although some commentators have questioned the continued viability of Craig after Crawford, lower federal
courts have upheld it, finding that Crawford applies only to testimonial statements made prior to trial and not to procedures or methods utilized to enhance a child‘s testimony during trial.400
In cases in which a child is found incompetent to testify or is
otherwise unavailable at the time of trial, the admissibility of the
child‘s testimonial statements will depend on whether the defendant
was afforded a prior opportunity for cross-examination. A pre-trial
deposition, which should take place after formal criminal charges are
filed, can provide the defendant with this opportunity, and assure that
a child‘s testimonial statements can be admitted at trial. Furthermore,
provided that certain requirements are met, a video-taped deposition

397

497 U.S. 836 (1990). This case addressed the constitutionality of a Maryland statute
that existed at the time that allowed one-way closed circuit testimony of child witnesses
upon a showing that testifying in a courtroom would cause the child to suffer ―serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.‖ Id. at 841 (citing MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii)(1989)). The Court noted that the principal
concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ―ensure the reliability of the evidence against a
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.‖ Id. at 845. The Court found that the Maryland procedure preserved all of the elements of the confrontation right except for face-to-face confrontation and
found that it furthered an important state interest – ―protecting child witnesses from the
trauma of testifying in [] child abuse case[s] is sufficiently important to justify the use of a
special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.‖ Id. at 855.
398
Raeder, supra note 6, at 1015.
399
Scallen, supra note 381, at 1592-93. For a discussion of Maryland v. Craig in a postCrawford world, see Raeder, supra note 1, at 386-87. Professor Raeder‘s recent work contains an in-depth discussion of the various methods of alternative testimony that may be employed. Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 WIDENER. L. REV. 239, 26162 (2010).
400
Scallen, supra note 381, at 1591-92 (citing United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307,
1313-14 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553-56
(8th Cir. 2005).
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can be admitted at trial in lieu of the child‘s in-court testimony.401
401

18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). This statute provides comprehensive and
thoughtful standards to be applied in circumstances involving the remote testimony of a
child and the use at trial of videotaped depositions at trial.
(2) Videotaped deposition of child.--(A) In a proceeding involving an alleged offense against a child, the attorney for the Government, the
child‘s attorney, the child‘s parent or legal guardian, or the guardian ad
litem appointed under subsection (h) may apply for an order that a deposition be taken of the child‘s testimony and that the deposition be recorded and preserved on videotape.
(B)
(i) Upon timely receipt of an application described in subparagraph (A),
the court shall make a preliminary finding regarding whether at the time
of trial the child is likely to be unable to testify in open court in the physical presence of the defendant, jury, judge, and public for any of the following reasons:
(I) The child will be unable to testify because of fear.
(II) There is a substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that the child would suffer emotional trauma from testifying in open court.
(III) The child suffers a mental or other infirmity.
(IV) Conduct by defendant or defense counsel causes the child
to be unable to continue testifying.
(ii) If the court finds that the child is likely to be unable to testify in open
court for any of the reasons stated in clause (i), the court shall order that
the child‘s deposition be taken and preserved by videotape.
(iii) The trial judge shall preside at the videotape deposition of a child
and shall rule on all questions as if at trial. The only other persons who
may be permitted to be present at the proceeding are—
(I) the attorney for the Government;
(II) the attorney for the defendant;
(III) the child‘s attorney or guardian ad litem appointed under
subsection (h);
(IV) persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment;
(V) subject to clause (iv), the defendant; and
(VI) other persons whose presence is determined by the court
to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child.
The defendant shall be afforded the rights applicable to defendants during trial, including the right to an attorney, the right
to be confronted with the witness against the defendant, and
the right to cross-examine the child.
(iv) If the preliminary finding of inability under clause (i) is based on
evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical presence of the
defendant, the court may order that the defendant, including a defendant
represented pro se, be excluded from the room in which the deposition is
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Prosecutors should be encouraged to employ these procedures whenever it is feasible to do so. Thus, the use of alternative competency
assessment tools, modifying the conditions under which young children testify, will operate to significantly increase the likelihood that
the testimony of young children will be admissible at trial.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court‘s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,
with its shift from a reliability-based approach to the current testimonial approach, has made it more difficult for prosecutors to have
children‘s hearsay statements admitted at trial. The Court‘s recent
decision in Bryant will likely add to this difficulty. First, the decision
treats domestic violence cases differently from other crimes in terms
of determining the state of an ongoing emergency. Second, it shifts
the focus of the primary purpose analysis to interrogators in instances
where the declarant operates under a disability. Third, it suggests
that statements made to ―state actors‖ can be testimonial.402 As a result, the Bryant opinion will likely increase the chances that courts
will find a child‘s out-of-court statements to be testimonial and therefore not admissible at trial unless the child testifies.
However, courts can increase the chances that children will
testify at trial by adopting alternative competency assessment tools
and by allowing children to testify under alternative conditions, such
as through the use of closed-circuit television or through the use of
pre-trial depositions in which the defendant is afforded an opportunity for cross-examination. These tools will assure that children will be
heard and that their complaints of sexual abuse will be admissible at
trial under circumstances that recognize the delicate balance that is
conducted. If the court orders that the defendant be excluded from the
deposition room, the court shall order that 2-way closed circuit television
equipment relay the defendant‘s image into the room in which the child
is testifying, and the child‘s testimony into the room in which the defendant is viewing the proceeding, and that the defendant be provided with
a means of private, contemporaneous communication with the defendant‘s attorney during the deposition.
Id. § 3509(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv); see also Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 237, at 316-17 (citing
John R. Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the Influence of
Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705, 706 (1987)); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 808
(1985).
402
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
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required to protect the compelling, yet competing, interests at stake:
the need to prosecute offenders of these horrific crimes and the need
to honor the mandate of the Confrontation Clause.
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